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Abstract 
The purpose of this investigation was to expand on the limited extant research exploring 
what people take into consideration when they judge the moral character of others.  
Specifically, I examined the preference for moral conflict or striving (vs. lack of 
temptation) across the domains of morality outlined in Haidt’s (2007) Moral 
Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2011), and investigated how moral character 
judgment relates to individual differences in morality and relevant constructs, as well as 
lifetime exposure to literature.  Results suggest that, at least for these domains of moral 
behavior, people tend to judge targets who are not tempted to act immorally more moral 
than those who are tempted, but behaved in a moral manner anyway.  However, there 
were significant differences in response between individual domains.  The vast majority 
of participants found people who did not have to strive to do the right thing more moral 
in the domains of fairness and care, whereas far more participants found striving to 
overcome temptation more moral in the domains of authority, loyalty, and purity.  In 
general, higher scores on measures that assess morally relevant constructs were 
associated with preferences for lack of temptation; increased exposure to both fiction 
and nonfiction tended to be associated with preferences for striving to overcome 
internal conflict.  Results are discussed with reference to prior research, study 
limitations, and future directions for the investigation of moral character judgment. 
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Introduction 
Much research has investigated how people make moral decisions.  
Hypothesized models take into account moral responsibility and blame based on a wide 
variety of factors, including causal and/or intentional frameworks (e.g., Cushman, 2008; 
Guglielmo, Monroe, & Malle, 2009; Shaver, 1985), moral intuitions or automatic 
processes (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Sunstein, 2005), deliberate cognitive processing (Koenigs 
et al., 2007; Kohlberg, 1971), emotion (e.g., Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Valdesolo 
and Desteno, 2006), relevant moral domains (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007), cognitive biases (e.g., Knobe, 2003, 2004; Lin, 
Zlatev, & Miller, 2016) or a combination of distinct processes (e.g., Cushman, Young, 
& Hauser, 2006; Greene, 2009, Lapsley & Hill, 2008; Wallach, Franklin, & Allen, 
2010).  The focus of research in moral psychology has largely been people’s perception 
or judgment of negative acts, usually those involving harm to other people (Guglielmo, 
2015).  Participants are often asked whether a given morally relevant act is appropriate 
or permissible (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 2009; Shtulman & Tong, 
2013), or whether someone was deserving of blame as a result of a morally relevant act 
(e.g., Black, 2016; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2012; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012).  
Efforts to explain moral judgment have thus focused primarily on the act (usually a 
moral violation) rather than on the moral character of the actor (but see Starmans & 
Bloom, 2016; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015).  As such, although there have 
been many investigations of how people judge immoral acts, much less has been done 
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to explore how people judge the moral character of others, particularly when it comes to 
praiseworthy action. 
The purpose of this investigation was to expand on the limited extant research 
exploring what people take into consideration when they judge the moral character of 
others.  First, I extended the work of Starmans and Bloom (2016), who examined 
children’s and adults’ preference for child actors who either overcome temptation or are 
never tempted at all, by focusing on adult actors across a wider variety of scenarios.  
Thus, the current studies examined the extent to which adult participants value striving, 
or the conscious effort to do the right thing, in others: are people who have to overcome 
temptation considered more moral than people who do not struggle to do the right 
thing?  When it comes to bad outcomes, it seems clear that someone who tries hard not 
to fall into temptation, but fails, will be seen as less “bad” than someone who does not 
hesitate to commit the immoral action, but when it comes to positive outcomes, 
predictions are more difficult.  Who is considered a better person: one who is tempted to 
do the wrong thing, but overcomes that temptation, or someone who was never tempted 
at all?  After examining participants’ reactions to these types of scenarios across several 
moral domains, I explored whether individual differences in relevant traits relate to 
preferences for moral conflict.  Specifically, I tested whether preferences for moral 
striving can be predicted by personality and morally relevant constructs, including need 
for closure, imaginative resistance to moral deviance in narrative, and ambiguity 
tolerance.  Finally, I investigated the relationship between exposure to fiction and moral 
character judgment.  Not only has it been suggested that fiction can and should cultivate 
moral sensitivity (Nussbaum, 1985), but preferences for certain genres of fiction may be 
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related to tolerance for moral ambiguity (see Black, Capps, & Barnes, 2017; Djikic, 
Oatley, & Moldoveanu, 2013).  Imaginative engagement with fiction could both reflect 
and influence the way in which people judge character in the real world. 
Taken as a whole, this work makes an important contribution to what we know 
about moral psychology and, in particular, moral character judgment, individual 
differences in morality, and the relationship between morality, imagination, and 
narrative. 
Moral Character Judgment 
Moral character development has been a perennial consideration for educational 
and developmental psychology (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971, Lapsley & Yeager, 2012), but 
most research in psychology has focused on how people judge moral acts rather than 
moral character (Uhlmann et al., 2015).  Participants are asked to judge whether a 
person (typically, the protagonist of a vignette, e.g. Young & Saxe, 2009) should be 
held morally responsible or blameworthy based on a single morally relevant action, 
usually with negative outcomes (Guglielmo, 2015).  This focus on the act distracts from 
the importance of the moral character of the actor; not only do people judge moral 
character based on concrete acts, they also allow prior beliefs about character influence 
their interactions with others (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005).  Importantly, 
judgments of an act may be dissociated with judgments of character (Giner-Sorolla & 
Chapman, 2017; Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011); victimless moral 
violations, such as disgust-provoking actions that violate moral purity concerns, may be 
seen as wrong precisely because they provide information about moral character 
(Uhlmann & Zhu, 2014).  Uhlmann and colleagues (2012; see also Goodwin, Piazza, & 
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Rozin, 2014) argue that the motivation to evaluate moral character, largely ignored in 
research, lies behind diverse results reported in the moral psychology literature.  
Although research on moral behavior is usually placed within the philosophical 
frameworks of deontology (duty-based ethics; e.g., Kohlberg’s (1971) Stages of Moral 
Development) and/or consequentialism (maximizing good outcomes; e.g., Greene, 
2009), people tend to be virtue theorists (focusing on virtue rather than rules or 
consequences) when it comes to predicting others’ behavior.  Attribution theories (e.g., 
Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973) address this in more general terms: when 
navigating social environments, we want to know why people do things.  Did they 
choose a given action because they were forced by circumstance, or because they 
wholeheartedly, in possession of the facts, intended to do so?  Perhaps more important 
when it comes to interpreting morally relevant actions, we want to know if they reflect 
more generally the actor’s traits or disposition.  Unfortunately, behavioral attributions 
are rarely made without a biased frame of reference (Weiner, 1995), and to the extent it 
is possible to arrive at an unbiased attribution, the assumption that an act is the result of 
internal processes provides insufficient information about the agent’s intentionality 
(Malle, 2011).  We do not only wish to know whether a person intended to do 
something, we want to have some idea of that person’s mental state, including beliefs, 
desires, awareness, and reasoning.  When it comes to moral acts, we seek out 
information about people’s trustworthiness, warmth, history of moral behavior, and 
desire to do the right thing (Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015; Krull, Seger, & Silvera, 
2008; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012; Uhlmann et al., 2015).  In short, we constantly 
assess moral character. 
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Moral character has traditionally been considered the province of virtue ethics, 
according to which moral virtue depends not only on the quality of an act, but on the 
way in which it is carried out: “The agent also must be in a certain condition when he 
does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, 
and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm 
and unchangeable character” (Aristotle, NE, Ross trans).  How we determine the quality 
of choice and firmness character of others, whose mental life may be unobservable, is 
not quite clear, especially when it comes to an initial character assessment based on 
limited information.  Previous research has assumed that people use decision-making 
time as a proxy for moral certainty (e.g., Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2012; Tetlock, 
Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), or simply informed participants of the 
willingness to act prosocially (Krull et al., 2008) and then asked them to rate the actors.  
Although the evidence is somewhat conflicting (cf. Critcher et al. and Tetlock et al.), 
people do appear to take into account deliberation. 
 Recently, researchers in psychology have shed light on how children and adults 
judge moral character, based on descriptions of the way protagonists of short stories 
arrive at decisions.  Starmans and Bloom (2016) presented children (ages five to eight) 
and adults with vignettes describing two individuals: one who was tempted to do the 
wrong thing, but ultimately acted morally, and one who acted morally without ever 
facing temptation at all.  The researchers then asked participants which of the two 
individuals was more moral.  The children overwhelmingly thought that the 
unconflicted individuals, who did not have to struggle to do the right thing, were “more 
good.”  Adults, on the other hand, believed conflicted protagonists, who had to strive to 
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do good, to be more moral.  Adults, Starmans and Bloom concluded, valued moral 
striving and effort (making them more Kantian than Aristotelian).  However, previous 
research that manipulated the time taken to make a morally relevant decision revealed 
conflicting results: in some cases, participants found the fast decision-maker more 
moral (Critcher et al., 2012), whereas in others, participants viewed people who 
deliberated longer more moral (Tetlock et al., 2000).  In all such cases, it appears that 
people look for hints about the mental activities of actors in their actions, such as 
deliberation time, or, in the case of vignettes, in descriptions of their feelings.  
Importantly, even when Starmans and Bloom (2016) found the clearest preference for 
moral striving in adults (good outcomes), many participants (31%) found the 
unconflicted character more moral, suggesting a role for individual differences in how 
people approach character judgment. 
Morality and Individual Differences  
There is ample evidence of individual differences in moral constructs such as 
empathy (Davis, 1980), moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 
2016; Hardy & Carlo, 2011), integrity (Schlenker, 2008), moral responsibility 
(Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Schwartz, 1968), moral agency 
(Black, 2016), Machiavellianism (Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009), and moral 
sensitivity (“chronicity,” or attentiveness to morally salient features; Narvaez, Lapsley, 
Hagele, & Lasky, 2006).  People also vary widely in their sensitivity to disgust in 
response to immoral behavior (Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017) as well as purity 
violations (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994).  The sensitivity to moral purity concerns 
is one part of Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
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Haidt & Joseph, 2007), which allows for individual differences in the extent to which 
people value different moral domains within a larger model of sociopolitical morality.  
According to MFT, moral judgments are a reflection of five basic values or moral 
domains: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and 
Purity (sanctity)/Degradation.  The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et 
al., 2011) measures the relative value people place on each moral domain when making 
moral decisions. 
Scores on the different subscales of the MFQ have been related to political 
orientation numerous times (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), with the so-called 
individualizing foundations of Care and Fairness (both of which emphasize the 
important of respecting the rights and needs of individuals and the avoiding harmful 
acts) given more relative value by liberals, and the binding foundations of Loyalty, 
Authority, and Sanctity (all related to the importance of protecting the community) 
valued primarily by conservatives (Graham et al., 2009).  Additionally, there is some 
evidence that moral domain affects moral judgment.  For example, Young and Tsoi 
(2015) found that whereas people take mental states (e.g., intentionality) into account 
when evaluating harm violations, they are much less likely to do so when evaluating 
purity violations.  Similarly, Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, and Kim (2014) found that 
although the individualizing foundations of Care and Fairness were related to workplace 
behavior, the binding foundations of Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity were not.  On the 
other hand, Parkinson and Byrne (2017) found that when assessing culpability for 
different moral violations, whether the act was intentional or accidental harm and 
whether it affected the self or another person mattered, but the moral domain did not.  
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Giner-Sorolla and Chapman (2017) provide evidence that moral character is judged 
somewhat independently of the act, and speculate that purity/sanctity violations are 
condemned precisely because of the character information they provide (see also 
Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Uhlmann, 2012).   
Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, and MacKinlay (2013), in an investigation of 
ideological differences in identification and appreciation of exemplary individuals, 
explored the extent to which a series of influential people (from Time magazine’s list) 
embodied characteristics from and promoted the values of the five MFT domains.  The 
goal was to identify which foundations were important indicators of moral worth, and 
which explained differences in moral character judgment between liberals and 
conservatives.  Ratings from experts (academics—social sciences) and general 
population suggested that people on both sides of the political spectrum value care, 
fairness, and purity when making moral character judgments.  Neither liberals nor 
conservatives seemed to consider loyalty a virtue, and authority was the only divisive 
foundation: conservatives valued it whereas liberals considered it a vice.  Frimer and 
colleagues relied on ratings of previously identified exemplars to assess the importance 
of the five moral foundations rather than asking participants to judge moral character, 
but their results suggest that behavior specific to the separate domains may influence 
judgment. 
Although there is limited research on the relationship amongst individual 
differences in other moral constructs and character judgment, various studies provide 
evidence of their association with morally relevant behavior.  Reported volunteering 
relates to higher scores in moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 
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2016) and moral agency (Black, 2016).  Stronger moral identity has also been 
(negatively) associated with counterproductive workplace behaviors, as has empathy, 
personality, and (positively) Machiavellianism (Cohen et al., 2014; Dahling et al., 
2009).  Other research suggests that when it comes to personality, agreeableness and 
neuroticism are the best predictors of moral behavior (Habashi, Graziano, & Hoover, 
2016), however, conscientiousness may also have moderately strong correlations with 
self-reported morality (Black & Barnes, in preparation), and both openness and 
neuroticism weaker, but significant correlations with judgments of moral permissibility 
(Black & Barnes, in preparation).  Moral permissibility was assessed with an adaptation 
of Shtulman and Tong’s (2013) Moral Judgment Task, a list of potential moral 
violations (primarily purity-related) that participants must categorize as “ever morally 
permissible” or not: Shtulman and Tong reported a moderate negative correlation with 
disgust sensitivity, which was replicated by Black et al. (2017).  Black and colleagues 
reported a stronger correlation with moral purity concerns (as measured by the MFQ 
Sanctity subscale); moral permissibility judgments were also related to exposure to 
fiction. 
Recent research on imaginative resistance, or the perceived reluctance to engage 
with morally deviant fictional worlds, has highlighted the connection between fiction 
and moral imagination (Black & Barnes, 2017).  Imaginative resistance—an inability or 
unwillingness to imagine certain things—had been discussed in the philosophical 
literature for the last few decades, with some philosophers arguing that it occurs 
primarily in response to moral violations (Gendler, 2000) and others that it occurs more 
generally, for example in response to aesthetics, humor, or violation of logical 
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reasoning (e.g., Weatherson, 2004; Yablo, 2009).  Yet others hold that there are no true 
cases of resistance; rather, it results from poor writing or lack of context (Stock, 2005; 
Todd, 2009).  Empirical research has provided evidence of individual differences in 
imagination resistance (Barnes & Black, 2016; Black & Barnes, 2017; Liao, 
Strohminger & Sripada, 2014).  Context does matter (Barnes & Black, in preparation; 
Liao et al., 2014), but some people may just have better imaginations than others (see 
Barnes & Black, 2016).   
Black and Barnes (2017) theorized that imaginative resistance may arise 
primarily due to fear of moral contagion: scores on their Imaginative Resistance Scale 
(IRS) were strongly and positively associated with greater disgust sensitivity and higher 
scores on the MFQ Purity subscale.  Such fear of moral contagion could make readers 
avoid empathizing with characters who hold contrary moral views (de Sousa, 2009), 
especially in light of research outlining the importance of reader identification with 
characters (e.g., Appel & Mara, 2013; Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004).  There is reason 
to believe that people judge fictional characters similarly to real-life people, especially 
when it comes to morally relevant actions: it has been argued that people use the same 
set of moral values when evaluating imaginary and real-life situations (Bartel, 2015; 
Weinberg & Meskin, 2006), that imaginative resistance may in part reflect the fear of 
exporting immoral beliefs into the real world (Gendler, 2006; Murray, 2001), and that 
fiction provides a moral training ground in which readers (and viewers) simulate social 
interactions and acquire sensitivity to morally salient aspects of the environment 
(Currie, 1995; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Nussbaum, 1985).  Thus, although imaginative 
resistance was conceptualized with reference to fiction, its strong association with moral 
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purity concerns and the fact that imagination is a necessary component of moral 
reasoning (Byrne, 2007, 2016; Moberg & Seabright, 2000) suggest that it may come 
into play when people are asked to make moral character judgments in the real world. 
Moral Character Judgment, Narrative, and Imagination 
More evidence for the involvement of imagination with moral judgment comes 
from research on fiction.  The fact that imaginative resistance discourages people from 
engaging with fictions that challenge their real-world moral beliefs may serve a 
protective function, as exposure to various fictional worlds not only seems to correlate 
with individual differences in moral constructs, but also may affect real-world judgment 
and behavior.  Exposure to fiction has been associated with different aspects of empathy 
(Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Black & Barnes, in preparation; Kidd & Castano, 2016), as 
well as theory of mind (Black & Barnes, 2015; Kidd & Castano, 2013; Mar et al., 2006; 
Panero et al., 2016, 2017) and prosocial behavior (Johnson, Cushman, Borden, & 
McCune, 2013).   
Black et al. (2017) reported that moral permissibility judgments were related to 
familiarity with four genres of fiction: greater familiarity with contemporary literary, 
fantasy, and science fiction was associated with more scenarios deemed permissible, 
whereas greater familiarity with romance mean fewer scenarios judged permissible.  
The negative association with romance exposure may reflect just world beliefs—that 
people’s actions will inevitably have morally consonant consequences, such that evil is 
punished and goodness rewarded—that drive a preference for the happy endings and 
unambiguous characters prevalent in romance novels (Appel, 2008; D’Alessio & Allen, 
2007).  Conversely, the positive relationship with contemporary literary, science fiction, 
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and fantasy exposure makes sense not only because of the imaginative engagement with 
fictions that push moral and physical boundaries, but also in light of the frequency of 
morally ambiguous situations and characters in these genres (Black et al., 2017).  The 
relationship of fiction and moral permissibility judgment has been confirmed in a 
sample of college undergraduates in a study that tested the relationship of fiction and 
nonfiction exposure with morality (empathy, moral identity, and moral agency; Black & 
Barnes, in preparation).  Interestingly, the strongest predictor of moral judgment, 
controlling for gender and personality, was familiarity with nonfiction authors, 
suggesting that narrative in general might relate to moral reasoning. 
Narrative nonfiction may be similar to real-world judgment in that, although 
situations are fact-based, both readers and real-world decision-makers must use their 
imaginations in order to put themselves in the place of others, whether they be the 
subjects of novels (Currie, 1995), memoirs, biographies, or historical treatises or the 
living, real people encountered at work (Moberg & Seabright, 2000; Whitaker & 
Godwin, 2013), or in psychological experiments.  Good narrative nonfiction presents 
the moral conflict and doubt that real people must navigate; expository nonfiction, such 
as history and philosophy, may also encourage the reader to dwell on moral judgment.  
The nonfiction authors used to test the relationship of moral permissibility judgment 
and nonfiction exposure included philosophers, historians, and scientists; it could be 
that reading such works encourages better imagination for occasions when behavior 
normally considered deviant might be acceptable.  Alternatively, people who read a lot 
of one type of book tend to read a lot in general, so it could be that those who are 
exposed to nonfiction authors also read a lot of fiction. 
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Clearly, both fiction and nonfiction narrative demand imaginative engagement 
on the part of the reader.  To the extent that such engagement serves as practice or 
simulation for real world social interactions and moral judgment (e.g., Mar & Oatley, 
2008), different types of narratives, with the distinct characteristics that determine their 
genre, may be related to real-life moral judgment.  People choose their reading material 
because they like it; thus, the enjoyment of novelty and tolerance for moral ambiguity 
may, for example, encourage readers to choose science fiction, which may in turn foster 
an even greater preference for stories that push moral and physical boundaries (Black et 
al., 2017; Djikic et al., 2013).  As such, familiarity with different genres may relate to 
moral character judgment in different domains. 
Contribution to the literature 
The purpose of this research was threefold.  First, I tested whether attitudes 
towards moral striving varied across the five moral domains described by Haidt’s Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham & Haidt, 2007; Graham at al., 2011; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004).  As such, participants were asked to identify the more moral protagonist, 
with both good and bad outcomes, in scenarios written for adults that feature moral 
behavior specific to the five domains.  Second, I investigated whether these moral 
character judgments would depend on individual differences in personality and 
constructs such as moral identity, ambiguity tolerance, and moral agency.  Finally, I 
explored the relationship between moral character judgment and lifetime exposure to 
both nonfiction and fiction across a wide variety of genres.  As such, this investigation 
addressed three understudied areas of moral psychology: moral character judgment, 
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positive moral behavior, and the relationship between imaginative engagement with 
narrative and moral judgment. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Study 1.  Study 1 tested for potential variation of the preference for moral 
conflict or striving found by Starmans and Bloom (2016)—which focused on vignettes 
about children who were tempted to lie or break promises—across the five moral 
domains described by Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory (Graham & Haidt, 2007; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2007).  Differences in preferences for moral conflict in scenarios where 
the protagonists made the moral choice (good outcomes) as well as the immoral choice 
(bad outcomes) were explored.  All vignettes featured moral behavior specific to each 
of the five domains of Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Respect for 
Authority/Subversion, and Purity/Degradation1, and matched across outcomes (good or 
bad) and condition (conflicted or unconflicted).  For each domain, two sets of vignettes 
were written, with protagonists that are either conflicted or not, and make the moral or 
immoral choice, such that participants were randomly presented with the conflicted and 
the unconflicted character and asked which is most moral.  Two pilot studies were used 
to test and perfect the vignettes. 
If preferences for conflicted vs. unconflicted characters depend on the relevant 
moral domain, then participant choice of the most moral protagonist (conflicted vs. 
unconflicted) would change across the domain.  If preferences do not depend on the 
moral domain, then participants would find the conflicted (or unconflicted) character 
                                                 
1 Henceforth, the domains will be referred to by their positive aspect: Care, Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, 
and Purity. 
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most moral (less immoral) across the domains when it comes to both good and bad 
outcomes (Starmans & Bloom, 2016). 
Hypotheses.  For Good Outcomes, I predicted that preferences for moral striving 
would vary across the domains.  Past research suggests that people’s intentions matter 
less when it comes to certain moral domains, particularly purity concerns (Young & 
Tsoi, 2013).  For the domains of Care and Fairness, I expected the results to be in line 
with those reported by Starmans and Bloom (2016): participants would tend to prefer 
the conflicted character (Hypothesis 1a).  For the binding domains of Loyalty, 
Authority, and Sanctity, I predicted outcomes different from those reported by Starmans 
and Bloom (whose vignettes only included behavior relevant to the Care domain): 
participants would prefer the unconflicted character (Hypothesis 1b).  When it comes to 
Loyalty or Authority, even contemplating disobedience may be considered 
disrespectful; similarly, impure thoughts may be equated with immoral contamination 
and sin (Bastian et al., 2015) and can cause people to feel contaminated in the absence 
of physical experience (Herba & Rachman, 2007).  As such, merely being tempted to 
violate the foundations of authority or sanctity may represent a moral contamination 
that offsets the preference for moral striving.  For Bad Outcomes, I expected results to 
be consistent with past research (Starmans & Bloom, 2016): participants would find the 
conflicted character—that is, the person who tries to fight temptation, but ultimately 
loses—more moral than an actor who does not even attempt to resist across domains. 
Study 2.  Study 2 investigated whether moral character judgments were related 
to individual differences in personality, moral constructs such as the five moral 
foundations comprising MFT, moral self, integrity, moral agency, Machiavellianism, 
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and potentially relevant traits such as ambiguity tolerance, need for cognition, and 
imaginative resistance.  In most cases, I had research questions rather than directional 
hypotheses, making this phase of the research primarily exploratory.  Because the 
results of Study 1 and the pilot study showed that preferences for striving did not vary 
in direction across domains, the relationship of each of the following variables and the 
overall preference for striving (summed across domains) were tested. 
Hypotheses.  Unless otherwise noted, all the following hypotheses were made 
with respect to scenarios with good outcomes (i.e., the protagonist makes the moral 
choice). 
Personality.  Past research has shown some aspects of personality to be directly 
related to scores on different MFQ scales (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010), as 
well as indirectly, through association with political orientation.  For example, 
conservatives tend to exhibit a greater need for order, less willingness to accept novelty, 
and value the binding foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity; all three binding 
foundations have been positively associated with conscientiousness, and Fairness and 
Care have been positively correlated with the Openness to Experience personality factor 
(Graham et al., 2011).  Other factors may have more complex associations: one aspect 
of agreeableness (compassion) was related to Care and Justice, whereas another aspect 
(politeness) was related to Authority (Hirsh et al., 2010).  It is unclear, however, if these 
factors would relate to domain-specific preferences for moral striving.  It could be that 
personality traits influence a global preference for or against moral striving, or that the 
relationship between these traits and a preference for moral striving may vary based on 
the relationship between specific traits and specific domains of morality. 
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Although there were no directional or domain-specific hypotheses for the Big 
Five factors, there was reason to believe that most would be related to moral character 
judgment in some way.  The personality factors of agreeableness and conscientiousness 
have been attributed to moral exemplars (Walker, 2010), and openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, and agreeableness (“moral personality”) have been shown to relate 
to moral identity (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010).  Further research suggests that 
openness may related to moral judgment; not only was it related to moral permissibility 
judgment (Black et al., 2017), but it was also associated with preference for liberal 
ideology reflected in the MFQ (Graham et al., 2012).  Conscientiousness may be related 
to both moral identity and moral agency (Black & Barnes, in preparation): it could be 
that people who are particularly conscientious place value on effort, in which case those 
who preferred the conflicted protagonist would have higher scores in conscientiousness.  
Alternatively, the reverse would be true if conscientious people believe that moral 
choices should be clear-cut, reflective of previously established moral clarity; similar 
alternatives existed for neuroticism, also related to morality in prior research (Black & 
Barnes, in preparation; Habashi, et al., 2016).  The only personality factor that lacked 
evidence to suggest a relationship with moral judgment is extraversion; I did not expect 
it to be related to character preference in any domain.   
Moral Foundations Theory.  Although it was logical to assume that scores on 
the five moral foundations will be related to moral character judgment, it was difficult 
to tell how they will be related.  People who scored high on the Fairness subscale might 
have preferred the conflicted protagonist, who weighs the good against the bad, when it 
comes to behavior relevant to the domain of Fairness only, or across all domains: 
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careful consideration of all options could matter just as much when it comes to the 
binding foundations of Authority, Loyalty, and Purity as it does when it comes to 
Fairness and Care.  Past research offered conflicting evidence when it comes to the 
relationship of domain with moral behavior (cf. Frimer et al., 2013; Giner-Sorolla & 
Chapman, 2017; Cohen et al., 2014; Parkinson & Byrne, 2017); as such, all analyses for 
the MFQ subscales were exploratory. 
Integrity.  Integrity, or the desire for consistency between the judgment (what 
ought to be done) and act, is a vital part of moral character (Blasi, 1980; Lapsley & 
Yeager, 2012).  To the extent that individuals value consistency of thought and action in 
others, those with greater integrity should find the unconflicted protagonists more 
moral, particularly when it comes to domains pertinent to integrity of action and 
thought.  As such, greater self-reported integrity was expected to predict a preference 
for the unconflicted protagonist across domains. 
Moral self.  The sense of moral self refers to the importance morality is given 
within a person’s self-concept (Black & Reynolds, 2016).  People with a strong sense of 
moral self understand themselves and their actions in moral terms, and strive to avoid 
harm to others.  Prior research showed that self-reported moral self scores are positively 
correlated with scores on four of the five MFQ subscales (all but Authority were 
statistically significant at p < .01; Black & Reynolds, 2016), suggesting that a strong 
self of moral self is related to moral values in general.  As such, I expected higher 
scores on the Moral Self scale to be associated with a preference for the unconflicted 
protagonist across domains.   
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Moral Agency.  Moral agency refers to the perception that one is in full control 
of actions that can affect the well-being of others (Black, 2016).  People with a strong 
sense of moral agency feel that they are able to act according to their own perception of 
right and wrong.  I expected perceived moral agency to be related to moral character 
judgments, but it was difficult to predict the direction of the relationship.  For example, 
people with a strong sense of moral agency might believe that one can and should 
exercise agency only after careful deliberation, and coming to the right decision after 
temptation is a show of strength.  In this case, moral agency scores would be higher for 
those who choose the conflicted protagonist.  On the other hand, a strong sense of 
agency could lead people to believe that one has no reason to doubt when it comes to a 
decision between right and wrong, resulting in higher moral agency scores for those 
who prefer the unconflicted protagonist.  As such, non-directional hypotheses of a 
difference between mean Moral Agency scores (conflicted vs. unconflicted) were made 
for scenarios where the protagonists make the moral choice.  In bad outcome scenarios, 
participants who found the unconflicted protagonist more moral were expected to self-
report less moral agency. 
Machiavellianism.  Machiavellianism refers to the willingness to manipulate 
and take advantage of others in order to further one’s own ambitions and/or fulfill one’s 
own desires (Dahling et al., 2009).  People who exhibit Machiavellian traits are willing 
to act immorally and have a cynical view of human nature, and are more likely to 
exhibit counterproductive workplace behaviors (Cohen et al., 2014; Dahling et al., 
2009).  Accordingly, although Machiavellianism may not be related to preferences for 
moral striving when it comes to good outcomes, it should be a good predictor of 
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preferences for the unconflicted protagonist in scenarios with immoral outcomes.  As 
such, I hypothesized that higher scores on the Machiavellianism scale would be 
associated with preferences for the unconflicted protagonist across domains. 
Ambiguity tolerance.  Tolerance for ambiguity refers to reactions to stimuli 
and/or situations that are “complex, dynamically uncertain, or subject to multiple 
conflicting interpretations” (McLain, 1993).  Individuals with greater tolerance for 
ambiguity feel more at ease when faced with such situations.  Because the conflicted 
protagonists consider the temptation to do otherwise, their desires are both complex and 
ambiguous.  It was reasonable to assume that participants with greater ambiguity 
tolerance would be better disposed towards the protagonists who must strive to do the 
right thing; I therefore predicted that participants who found the conflicted protagonist 
more moral would have more tolerance for ambiguity. 
Need for cognition.  Need for cognition refers to the preference for and 
tendency to enjoy cognitive challenges (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).  Individuals with greater need for cognition tend to prefer 
complex to simple tasks and are willing to expend the mental effort needed to organize 
and structure information and engage in problem solving.  Moreover, recent research 
suggests that need for cognition may contribute to morally relevant behavior: Strobel, 
Grass, Pohlin, and Strobel (2017) found that need for cognition predicted self-reported 
moral behavior over and above moral variables such as moral judgment, moral identity, 
and empathy.  Given that those high in need for cognition enjoy thinking and reasoning 
about complex information and problem-solving, I predicted that those who prefer the 
conflicted protagonist will self-report greater need for cognition. 
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Imaginative resistance.  Imaginative resistance refers to the reluctance some 
people experience when they are asked to engage with fictional worlds that feature 
deviant moral paradigms (Gendler, 2000).  Individual differences in imaginative 
resistance have been associated with moral purity concerns and disgust sensitivity 
(Black & Barnes, 2017), and may reflect general imaginative ability (Barnes & Black, 
2016).  Five of the 13 IRS items refer to characters, and IRS scores are strongly and 
negatively correlated with preferences for morally ambiguous characters (r = -.51; 
unpublished research).  If the inability or reluctance to imagine situations in which a 
good person would contemplate acting immorally is related to imaginative resistance, 
then participants who experienced greater resistance would prefer the unconflicted 
protagonist across domains. 
Study 3.  Study three explored the relationship between moral character 
judgment and lifetime exposure to narrative.  Author checklists (cf. Acheson, Wells, & 
MacDonald, 2008; Black et al., 2017; Mar et al., 2006; Stanovich & West, 1989) were 
used to measure exposure to eight genres (classics, contemporary literary, fantasy, 
historical fiction, horror, mystery/thriller, romance, and science fiction), young adult 
fiction and nonfiction.  Fiction in general tends to feature characters who struggle with 
difficult choices, and thus fiction exposure may be related to increased tolerance or 
preference for conflicted moral actors.  Similarly, greater amounts of imaginative 
engagement with fiction may facilitate an ability to create backstories for the scenarios 
that could make the unconflicted protagonist appear more moral in cases with bad 
outcomes.  However, different genres feature distinct characteristics (e.g., Carroll, 2015; 
Rieder, 2010; Selinger, 2013) that could affect preferences for moral striving.  Prior 
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research suggests that genre preferences may be reflected in real world moral judgment 
(Black et al., 2017).  For example, exposure to contemporary literary, fantasy, and 
science fiction was uniquely and positively associated with the tendency to find more 
morally deviant scenarios potentially permissible, whereas familiarity with romance 
meant fewer scenarios deemed permissible.  The hypotheses below address expectations 
for specific genres and domains; the effects of exposure to different genres, YA fiction, 
narrative nonfiction and general nonfiction were also tested across moral domains.  
Hypotheses.  First, I predicted that greater familiarity with Romance and 
Mystery/Thriller authors would be associated with an increased tendency to prefer the 
unconflicted protagonist across domains.  Past research suggests that these genres tend 
to be read by people who can imagine fewer exceptions to moral rules (Black et al., 
2017).  What is more, both romances and mysteries are written according to strict genre 
rules that ensure set plot characteristics.  In mysteries, a detective, amateur or 
professional, follows a logical process of information gathering and causal inferences.  
Romances are written according to industry-determined plot structures.  Both genres are 
defined according to their resolution (the bad guy is uncovered, love is found).  Such 
adherence to rules may discourage a tolerance of moral ambiguity, such as that revealed 
in the thought processes of conflicted moral characters in the stimuli vignettes. 
Second, I expected familiarity with contemporary literary, fantasy, and science 
fiction authors to be associated with preferences for the conflicted protagonist across 
domains.  In contrast to mystery and romance, literary fiction tends to push the 
boundaries of societal mores (see Djikic & Oatley, 2014; van Lissa, Caracciolo, van 
Duren, & van Leuveren, 2016) and focus on the interior life of complex characters who 
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struggle to do the right thing (or fail to do so).  Fantasy and science fiction not only 
involve stretching the limits of physical reality, they frequently describe worlds where 
real-world moral taboos are non-existent.  As such, I expected familiarity with authors 
in these genres to relate to preference for the conflicted protagonists in all domains. 
See Table 1 for all hypotheses. 
Pilot Studies 
To test the equivalence of the vignettes within domains, two pilot studies were 
run.  Pilot Study 1, registered on Open Science Framework for the Pre-registration 
Challenge (osf.io/3krjd), tested preliminary versions of the vignettes and included the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011).  In this initial pilot study (N = 
175, 71.4% female), participants had chosen the most moral protagonist from the two 
different vignettes (e.g., versions A and B for Purity).  This resulted in significantly 
different responses across vignettes for all domains except Care.  I therefore ran a 
second pilot study, matching conflicted vs. unconflicted in the same version of the 
vignettes (which were also revised).  In Pilot Study 2 (N = 112, 57.1% female), there 
were no differences in proportions within domains (0.16 ≤ Χ2 ≤ 2.23, 0.135 ≤ p ≤ .684).  
I therefore proceeded to use the vignettes (Appendix A) from Pilot Study 2.  (See 
Appendix C for results from Pilot Study 2). 
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Table 1 
 
Hypotheses for Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
Study 1  
 • For good outcomes, preferences for moral striving will vary 
across domains. 
 • In the domains of Care and Fairness, participants will find the 
conflicted protagonist more moral 
 • In the three binding domains, participants will find the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral 
 • For bad outcomes, participants will find the conflicted 
protagonist more moral across domains. 
Study 2  
Personality • The personality factors of Openness, Conscientiousness, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism will be related to moral 
judgment (positive outcomes); nondirectional. 
Moral 
Foundations  
• Exploratory analyses. 
Integrity • Participants who prefer the unconflicted protagonist will have 
higher scores on the integrity scale (across domains) 
Moral self • Participants who prefer the unconflicted protagonist will have 
higher scores on the moral self scale (across domains) 
Moral Agency • Moral agency will be related to moral character judgment in all 
domains (positive outcomes; nondirectional). 
 • In negative outcome scenarios, greater moral agency will be 
associated with preferences for the conflicted protagonists. 
Machiavellianism • In negative outcome scenarios, participants who prefer the 
unconflicted protagonist will score higher on the Machiavellian 
Personality Scale. 
Ambiguity 
Tolerance 
• Participants who prefer the conflicted protagonist will have 
greater tolerance for ambiguity (positive outcomes, across 
domains). 
Need for 
cognition 
• Participants who prefer the conflicted protagonist will have 
greater need for cognition (positive outcomes, across domains). 
Imaginative 
resistance 
• Higher scores on the Imaginative Resistance Scale will be 
associated with the preference for the unconflicted protagonists 
across domains (good outcomes) 
Study 3  
Fiction exposure • Greater familiarity with Mystery/Thriller and Romance authors 
will be related to preferences for the unconflicted protagonists 
across domains (positive outcomes). 
 • Greater familiarity with contemporary literary, fantasy, and 
science fiction authors will be associated with preferences for 
the conflicted protagonist across domains. 
 • For all other genres, YA fiction, and nonfiction all analyses 
will be exploratory 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Two samples were tested: an undergraduate sample and a Web-based sample.  
In the undergraduate sample, 535 (76.6% female; 90.4% under 20; 96.4% under 21) 
cases completed Part 1; 472 cases completed parts 1 and 2 (all available good cases 
were used on an analysis-by-analysis basis).  Of these, forty participants were discarded 
for survey response times of less than ten minutes, vignette response times of less than 
45 seconds, excessive guessing on the Author Recognition tasks (3.0+ standard 
deviations above mean foils), or a combination of the above.  Forty more cases were 
discarded for failing the manipulation checks for the positive outcome vignettes, leaving 
441 good cases (77.6% female, 96.6% under 21; see Table 2 for ethnicity details).  Of 
these, 401 participants completed the second part of the survey, which contained the 
bad outcome vignettes; 34 of these failed the manipulation checks, leaving 367 good 
cases (79.6% female).  The undergraduate sample was majority conservative-leaning 
(63.2%) and primarily Christian (43.4% Protestant, 16.8% Catholic); see Table 2 for 
details. 
In the Web sample, 238 people (67.6% women, mean age = 30.20) took part.  Of 
these, 31 failed one or more manipulation checks and 21 were discarded for excessive 
guessing or low time, leaving 186 cases (68.8% female, mean age = 31.02).  This 
sample leaned liberal (66.8%; see Table 2 for details). 
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Table 2 
 
Demographic information for undergraduate and web samples. 
 Undergraduate Web 
 N % N % 
Ethnicity     
African American/Black 24 4.8 9 3.8 
Asian 37 7.5 34 14.3 
Hispanic 32 6.5 19 8.0 
Native American 10 2.0 4 1.7 
Pacific Islander 1 0.2 0 0 
White (non-Hispanic) 348 70.3 156 65.5 
Multiracial 37 7.5 6 2.5 
Other 5 1.0 6 2.5 
Missing   4 1.7 
Political Orientation     
Very conservative 28 5.7 5 2.1 
Conservative 124 25.1 30 12.6 
Moderately conservative 161 32.5 43 18.1 
Moderately liberal 109 22.0 57 23.9 
Liberal 56 11.3 62 26.1 
Very liberal 17 3.4 38 16.0 
Missing   3 1.3 
Religion     
Catholic 83 16.8   
Protestant 215 43.4   
Muslim 7 1.4   
Hindu 8 1.6   
Jewish 3 0.6   
Buddhist 1 0.2   
Religious but unaffiliated 35 7.1   
Agnostic 29 5.9   
Atheist 9 1.8   
None 20 4.0   
Other 30 6.1   
Missing 55 11.1   
Mother’s education     
Less than high school 11 2.2   
High school diploma 41 8.3   
Some college 75 15.2   
Associate’s degree or similar 41 8.3   
Bachelor’s degree 182 36.8   
Some graduate work 9 1.8   
Graduate or professional degree 80 16.2   
Missing 56 11.3   
Note. Full sample: N = 495 for undergraduates (not all answered all questions); N = 238 for web. 
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Procedure 
All data was collected via Qualtrics.  College undergraduates participated 
through the departmental subject pool, completing a two-part survey in exchange for 
course credit.  The first part contained the vignettes with good outcomes: first, all 
participants completed a vignette adapted from Starmans and Bloom (2016) that 
featured a helping scenario, about a child who is tempted not to help his sister (vs. one 
who is not tempted) but ends up helping.  Participants were asked to judge which of the 
two children was more moral.  Next, participants were presented with five pairs of 
vignettes representing the moral domains, in random order.  Each pair included the 
conflicted and the unconflicted protagonists in matched vignettes, such that it was clear 
that the choice was between a person who had no hesitation in doing the right thing and 
one who had to overcome the temptation not to do so.  For each domain, one of two 
possible vignettes was randomly selected for presentation (details below).   
At the end of the first survey, participants were directed to a second survey 
instrument in Qualtrics, which collected email addresses and automatically distributed 
Part 2 after seven days.  In Part 2, participants were presented with the bad outcome 
vignettes (beginning with an example from Starmans and Bloom), in the same manner 
described for Part 1. 
In the Web sample, adults were recruited via postings on social networking sites 
such as Facebook and Reddit (43%), as well as on sites dedicated to psychological 
research, such as Social Psych Network and Psychological research on the Net (57%).  
All participants completed a Qualtrics survey that presented the good outcome vignettes 
as described above.   
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Materials  
Demographics.  Items addressing gender (male, female, other/prefer not to 
answer), political orientation, age, mother’s education, and religious affiliation were 
included.  Political orientation was assessed with a single 6-point item (very 
conservative, conservative, moderately conservative, moderately liberal, liberal, very 
liberal).  Religious affiliation was assessed in a single multiple-choice item (Catholic, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Protestant, Sikh, agnostic, atheist, other).  For the 
Web sample, only gender, ethnicity, and political orientation were included.  See 
Appendix C for associations between demographics and variables of interest. 
Vignettes.  Five sets of vignettes (See Appendix A), one per moral foundation, 
were written to target the moral domain in question.  Care was taken to avoid scenarios 
relevant to more than one domain (for example, respect for authority could not include 
family as the relevant authority, because loyalty is also at issue when it comes to 
family).  All scenarios featured a protagonist with a gender-neutral name and did not 
use gender pronouns.  For each domain, two base vignettes were created that were then 
adapted to feature conflicted or unconflicted protagonists making either the “moral” or 
“immoral” decision.  As such, a total of eight separate vignettes were written for each 
domain (e.g. Care A conflicted, Care A unconflicted, Harm A conflicted, Harm A 
unconflicted; Care B conflicted, Care B unconflicted, Harm B conflicted, Harm B 
unconflicted).  Participants were randomly assigned to A or B (conflicted vs. 
unconflicted) versions within each of the five domains; domains were also presented in 
random order.  For each set of vignettes, participants were asked first (as a manipulation 
check) who of the two protagonists found it easy (e.g., “Who found it easy to do 
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something good, Pat or Skyler?”) and who found it difficult (“Who found it difficult to 
do something good, Pat or Skyler?”).  Finally, they were asked “Who is the most moral 
person?” 
Data Analyses 
Power analyses.  Sample size estimates for the pilot study were based on 
Starmans and Bloom (2016).  Starmans and Bloom reported a large effect size of g = 
.38 for adults in Study 1 (good outcomes).  Power analyses for binomial sign test (using 
G*Power [Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009]), with a small-medium effect size 
(g=.10), indicates the need for N = 199 to reach power = .80 (Cohen, 1988) for the test 
of a single domain.  The larger sample, although potentially unnecessary if the effect 
sizes were similar to that reported in Starmans and Bloom, allowed for a smaller effect 
size in each individual domain comparison. 
Stopping rule.  Data collection was restricted to a single semester.  Initial 
analyses had suggested collecting data from 425 undergraduates to ensure sufficient 
numbers of good cases; a large subject pool necessitated continued collection until the 
end of the fall semester.  For adult participants from the web sample, data collection 
was stopped at the end of the semester. 
Data exclusion.  Participants who had spent less than ten minutes on the surveys 
as a whole, or less than 45 seconds per scenario, were discarded.  Manipulation checks 
were included with each scenario (described below); data from participants who failed 
them was not included.  For Study 3, participants who had a guessing score (number of 
foils or fake names chosen on the GFT or YAFT) greater than 3.0 standard deviations 
above the mean were discarded. 
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Analyses.  Cochran’s Q was used as an omnibus test for differences in 
responding across domains (cases that had failed a manipulation check in any domain 
were excluded).  McNemar’s test was used to test for differences between domains. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
First, I tested whether responses within domains varied across the two vignettes.  
In the undergraduate sample, for positive outcomes, there were no differences in 
response to the two scenarios within the Care, Fairness, Authority, and Loyalty domains 
(Χ2 values (df = 1) ≤ 0.94, ps ≥ .332, but within the Purity domain, participants were 
more likely to select the conflicted protagonist as the more moral individual in the first 
vignette (incest) than in Vignette B (cannibalism; Χ2 (df = 1) = 4.24, p = .040).  I 
therefore tested the two groups (vignette A vs. B) separately for each analysis reported 
below; when the results did not differ, I combined the groups and report the statistics for 
the entire sample (when they differ, I report results for each group).  For bad outcomes, 
no significant differences in responses to vignettes within domains emerged, 0.02 ≤ Χ2 
(df = 1) ≤ 1.29; 0.256 ≤ p ≤ .889.   
In the Web sample, which only responded to good outcomes scenarios, there 
were no differences for Fairness, Authority, Loyalty, and Purity (Χ2 values (df = 1) ≤ 
0.64, ps ≥ .424), but in the Care domain, participants were more likely to prefer the 
conflicted protagonist for vignette B (Χ2 (df = 1) = 39.57, p < .001); because no one 
selected the conflicted protagonist in vignette A, I could not test the vignettes 
separately.  Results are reported for the combined vignettes, with the caveat that future 
testing is needed. 
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Next, I tested for order effects within domains (positive outcomes).  Order did 
not affect responses for any domain in the undergraduate sample for positive outcomes 
(1.27 ≤ Χ2 (df = 4) ≤ 7.64, 0.106 ≤ p ≤ .867).  Nor did responses vary with order of 
presentation for bad outcomes, (1.20 ≤ Χ2 (df = 4) ≤ 8.08, 0.089 ≤ p ≤ .878).  There 
were no order effects for the web sample either, Χ2 values (df = 4) ≤ 3.28, ps ≥ .512. 
Gender.  In the undergraduate sample, gender was not related to moral 
judgment in any domain for good outcomes (ps > .200), or in the domains of Care, 
Fairness, Authority, and Loyalty for bad outcomes (ps > .890).  In the Purity domain, 
bad outcomes, women (93%) were more likely to find the conflicted protagonist more 
moral than men (84%) were, Χ2(df = 1) = 5.51, p = .019.  In the Web sample, gender 
was not related to moral judgment in the domains of Care, Fairness, Loyalty, or Purity 
(ps > .650), but in the Authority domain, women (43%) were much more likely to find 
the conflicted protagonist more moral than men (14%) were, Χ2(df = 1) = 12.93, p < 
.001.   
Primary Analyses 
Good outcomes.  The first hypothesis, that preferences for moral striving will 
vary across the domains, was supported.  Although participants tended to find the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral across domains, there was significant variation in 
proportions as detailed below (see Table 3). 
Undergraduate sample.  For all domains, participants found the protagonist who 
was not tempted to do wrong more moral (observed proportions ≥ .83, binomial tests ps 
< .001; see Table 3.  However, there were differences in responding between domains,  
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Table 3 
 
Proportions of participants who preferred the unconflicted vs. the conflicted 
protagonist in undergraduate and web samples. 
Domain Unconflicted Conflicted 
Proportion 
unconflicted 
p 
Positive outcomes     
Undergraduate     
Care 361 80 .82 < .001 
Fairness 386 55 .88 < .001 
Authority 327 114 .74 < .001 
Loyalty 293 148 .66 < .001 
Purity 339 102 .77 < .001 
Vignette A 160 60 .73 < .001 
Vignette B 179 42 .81 < .001 
Web     
Care 150 27 .85 < .001 
Vignette A 92 0 1.0 < .001 
Vignette B 58 27 .64 .001 
Fairness 150 26 .85 < .001 
Authority 114 63 .64 < .001 
Loyalty 93 83 .53 .498 
Purity 105 71 .60 .013 
Negative Outcomes (undergraduate only)   
Harm 26 337 .07 < .001 
Cheating 29 334 .08 < .001 
Subversion 30 333 .08 < .001 
Betrayal 64 299 .18 < .001 
Degradation 39 323 .11 < .001 
Note. Binomial tests used to compare proportions (null hypothesis = .50).  Because 
responses across vignettes differed for Purity in the Undergraduate sample and Care 
in the Web sample, results are reported for each vignette separately. 
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Cochran’s Q (df = 4) = 94.24, p < .001.  Participants were more likely to find the 
conflicted protagonist more moral in the Loyalty than in the Care, Fairness, and 
Authority domains (ps ≤ .005), and than the Purity domain overall (p < .001, but this 
was true for Vignette B [cannibalism] and not A [incest; p = .523]).  Participants were 
also more likely to find the conflicted protagonist more moral in the authority domain 
than in the Care or Fairness domains (ps ≤ .001); there was no difference in responses 
between the Authority and Purity domains (p = .285).  Participants were more likely to 
find the conflicted protagonist more moral in the Purity than in the Fairness domain (p < 
.001).  The relationship between responses for the Purity and Care domains depended 
on the Purity Vignette: There was no difference for Vignette B (cannibalism; p > .999), 
but those who read Vignette A (incest) were much more likely to find the conflicted 
protagonist more moral in the Purity than in the Care domain (p = .001).  See Figure 1. 
Web Sample.  Preference for moral striving varied across domains, Cochran’s Q 
(df = 4) = 93.28, p < .001.  A series of McNemar’s tests showed that there was no 
difference in responses between the Care and Fairness domains (p > .999), the 
Authority and Purity domains (p = .321), or Loyalty and Purity domains (p = .134).  
Participants were more likely to find the conflicted protagonist more moral in the three 
binding domains (Authority, Loyalty, and Purity) than in the individualizing domains of 
Care and Fairness (all pairwise tests, p < .001).  They were also more likely to find the 
conflicted protagonist more moral in the Loyalty than in the Authority domain, p = 
.010.  See Figure 1. 
In the domains of Care and Fairness, participants were expected to prefer the 
conflicted character; as in the undergraduate sample, this was not supported.  Not only  
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Figure 1. Good outcome scenarios. Percentage of participants identifying 
the conflicted vs. the unconflicted protagonists as more moral in each 
domain.  Results from the undergraduate sample are presented in the top 
graph; results from the web sample are presented in the bottom graph. 
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did participants prefer the unconflicted protagonist, but the preference was stronger in 
these domains than in the other domains.  In the binding domains of Loyalty, Authority, 
and Sanctity/Purity, participants were predicted to judge the unconflicted character 
more moral; this was partially supported.  Participants in both samples were 
significantly more likely to select the unconflicted protagonist as the more moral 
individual in the domains of Authority and Purity, and this was true in the Loyalty 
domain in the undergraduate sample as well.  In the Web sample, however, participants 
were equally likely to select the conflicted and unconflicted protagonists in the Loyalty 
domain. 
Bad outcomes.  Participants were predicted to find the conflicted character 
more moral than an actor who does not even attempt to resist across domains.  This 
hypothesis was supported, although there were differences in responding.  For all 
domains, participants found the protagonist who fought temptation before doing wrong 
more moral (observed proportions ≥ .82, binomial tests ps < .001); however, there were 
differences in responding across domains, Cochran’s Q (df = 4) = 34.72, p < .001.  
McNemar’s test showed that participants were more likely to find the unconflicted 
protagonist more moral in the Loyalty vignettes than in any other (ps ≤ .006).  There 
were no other significant pairwise differences.  See Figure 2. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
Because of the differences in political makeup and results across the two 
samples, post hoc analyses were run to test for differences in responding according to 
political orientation across domains.  First, a dichotomous variable (conservative vs. 
liberal) was created from the 6-point political orientation item in both undergraduate  
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Figure 2. Bad outcome scenarios (undergraduate sample). Percentage of participants 
identifying the conflicted vs. the unconflicted protagonists as more moral in each 
domain are presented above.   
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and web samples.  Next, separate chi square tests of independence were run for each 
domain.  In the undergraduate sample, the proportion of conservatives who judged the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral tended to be greater than that of liberals across 
domains, but the differences were greater in the binding domains of Authority, Loyalty, 
and Purity.  A very similar pattern of results was evident in the Web sample, with even 
less disparity in judgment between liberals and conservatives in the Care and Fairness 
domains.  See Table 4 for details. 
Next, the files were split to rerun the analyses testing for differences across and 
between domains separately for liberals and conservatives.  Results suggested that, 
although conservatives and liberals tend to judge differently within domains, the overall 
pattern of moral judgment is the same for both.  In both samples, responses varied 
across domains for both liberals and conservatives, Cochran’s Q ≥ 11.34, p ≤ .023, 
although the test was not statistically significant at p < .001 for conservatives in the 
Web sample (see Table 4). 
Discussion 
Across the five moral domains proposed by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; 
Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) and targeted here, 
participants tended to judge lack of temptation more moral than striving.  These results 
stand in direct contrast to earlier work by Starmans and Bloom (2016), who reported 
that adults, in contrast to young children, judged conflicted actors more moral than 
unconflicted ones.  Notably, although overall participants were much more likely to find 
individuals who were effortlessly good to be more moral than those who overcame the 
temptation to do the wrong thing, there were significant differences between domains in  
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Table 4 
 
Differences in moral judgment for conservatives vs. liberals for good outcome 
vignettes, undergraduate and Web samples. Cochran’s Q and corresponding p-values 
for comparisons across domains for conservatives and liberals presented below 
corresponding proportions. 
 Proportion unconflicted   
 Conservative Liberal Χ2 ptwo-tailed 
Undergraduate     
Care .85 .77 3.81 .051 
Fairness .90 .84 3.00 .083 
Authority .80 .72 3.99 .046 
Loyalty .71 .59 5.92 .015 
Purity .79 .67 7.48 .006 
Cochran’s Q  50.16 44.99   
p < .001 < .001   
Web     
Care .87 .84 0.27 .606 
Fairness .87 .84 0.16 .686 
Authority .76 .59 4.19 .041 
Loyalty .70 .46 8.48 .004 
Purity .70 .56 3.05 .081 
Cochran’s Q  11.34 82.96   
p .023 < .001   
Note. Chi square tests of independence used.  No significant differences were found 
for bad outcomes (.201 ≤ p ≤ .787).  
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 this tendency.  Contrary to expectations, participants were much more likely to choose 
the unconflicted protagonist as the more moral individual in the domains of Care and 
Fairness than in the binding domains of Authority, Loyalty, and Purity.  Importantly, 
although some differences emerged across samples, the same general pattern of results 
was observed for both undergraduate participants and the Web sample, as well as for 
both liberal participants and conservatives.  Below I will discuss, first, the overall 
tendency to find lack of conflict more moral, and second, the surprising differences 
between the moral domains. 
That participants in this study overwhelmingly chose unconflicted individuals as 
more moral than those who had to overcome temptation is striking, given that this is the 
opposite pattern of what has been found in prior research.  There are several possible 
explanations.  It could be that although adults believe children (featured in Starmans 
and Bloom’s [2016] vignettes) benefit from reflecting on less moral alternatives before 
choosing to do the right thing, they believe that adults should already have figured out 
what the right thing to do is.  Adults, in other words, shouldn’t be tempted to harm or 
cheat others, as they are assumed to have reached their highest level of moral 
development (and potentially are too old to learn by overcoming temptation).  
Moreover, it is easier to attribute the good behavior of a child (who is not tempted to do 
wrong) to parental pressure rather than any internal desire to do right; adults, on the 
other hand, are easily assumed to be autonomous agents, acting on internal (moral in 
this case) desires (see Kelley, 1973).   
Alternatively, it may be that the actions in the child-centric vignettes used by 
Starmans and Bloom (and as trial vignettes in the current research) are intrinsically 
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different from those featured in the adult-centric vignettes used here to test the 
violations of the moral domains.  The child vignettes featured helping (not helping), 
telling the truth (lying), or keeping a promise (or not).  Vignettes in the current study 
featured acting kindly (providing emotional support to someone in need) or honestly 
(distributing money fairly), choosing to remain loyal, respecting authority, or following 
purity norms (avoiding incest or not eating a dead body), all of which are more 
complex, adult actions.  Although it might seem intuitive for people to deliberate about 
their actions more in more complex situations, the greater complexity of vignettes and 
the actions featured here may have triggered prior biases (see Guglielmo, 2015); for 
example, participants might have thought “they should know better by now!”  In other 
words, it could be that either the actors or the actions featured in the current vignettes 
encouraged preference for the unconflicted protagonist, independently of moral domain. 
A second result that merits consideration is that, of all the moral domains tested 
here, the bias in favor of morally unconflicted individuals was strongest for the domains 
of Care and Fairness.  Although this effect runs counter to initial hypotheses, it may 
make sense when viewed through the lens of Moral Foundations Theory.  Moral 
concerns about care (not harming others) and fairness or social justice are universal; 
both liberals and conservatives, Haidt has claimed (2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007), 
value Care and Fairness, but only conservatives have moral concerns regarding 
Authority, Loyalty, and Purity.  As such, the greater agreement on moral judgment in 
the Care and Fairness vignettes than in the binding domains may simply reflect the 
broader agreement across the political spectrum.  Indeed, post hoc analyses showed no 
significant differences in judgment between conservatives and liberals in the Care and 
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Fairness domains.  On the other hand, there were much greater differences in judgment 
in the three binding domains (see Table 4).  Whereas everyone may agree that by the 
time people reach adulthood they should know better than to harm or cheat another, the 
importance given to respect for authority, loyalty, and purity in part seems to depend 
upon political orientation.  These results are in line with prior research: Frimer and 
colleagues (2013) found that liberals and conservatives agreed on the importance of 
care and fairness when it came to evaluating known exemplars, but they disagreed 
strongly on the value of authority, with conservatives finding it admirable to respect 
authority whereas liberals did not.  In terms of the present research, such an opposing 
approach to authority would result in liberals sometimes finding the protagonist who 
doubted authority (conflicted) more moral, whereas conservatives should more 
uniformly find lack of conflict more moral; post hoc analyses supported this reasoning, 
although further research is needed to confirm the results.  The current results, 
especially for the Web sample, suggest that political orientation may also affect 
character judgment in the Loyalty domain. 
Despite political differences that merit further research, both conservative 
participants and liberal participants showed a smaller bias for unconflicted protagonists 
in the binding domains (Loyalty, Purity, and Authority) compared to the individualizing 
domains of Fairness and Harm.  This result was unexpected.  Because purity by its very 
nature demands wholehearted endorsement (and even a small affront to it can elicit a 
reaction; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011), it seemed intuitively sound to believe participants 
would find even being tempted to violate purity norms wrong (especially when it comes 
to incest).  Similarly, although thinking about breaking rules does not incur legal 
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penalties, in real-world social interactions, hesitation to obey is treated like 
disobedience, and the implication that a friend (or significant other) might be disloyal 
can feel like betrayal; yet, these were the very domains in which participants were most 
willing to consider the individual who had an internal debate about doing the right thing 
to be more moral than one who acted morally without debate or effort.  Thus, is worth 
examining the results in each of the three binding domains in more detail. 
 Curiously, in the undergraduate sample, responses to the two purity vignettes 
were significantly different: it was in the incest vignette that participants were more 
likely to find the conflicted protagonist more moral, rather than in the cannibalism 
vignette.  To what degree might this reflect beliefs or attitudes regarding sexual 
temptation more broadly?  Given that there were no significant differences in 
responding in the pilot study or the web sample, the difference found between the two 
Purity vignettes in the undergraduate sample may be due to chance, but it is still worthy 
of further study.  
Equally intriguing were the responses in the Loyalty domain: in both samples, 
participants were most likely to choose the individual who overcame temptation as the 
more moral of the two in the vignettes targeting loyalty, and in the Web sample, 
participants were just as likely to choose the conflicted protagonist as more moral as 
they were to choose the unconflicted one.  One vignette featured loyalty to the family 
business; the other featured loyalty to a college sports team.  It is possible that 
participants simply do not find leaving the family business or the college team to be a 
morally relevant violation of loyalty, thus leading to more chance responding, but this 
seems unlikely given that loyalty, as proposed by Moral Foundations Theory and based 
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in evolutionary theory (Graham et al., 2012), is to the group: family is the most 
important group from an evolutionary point of view, and even the most basic 
assignment to “teams” inspires group behavior (Minimal Group Paradigm; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  A more plausible explanation is that these particular 
challenges to moral character are seen as more tempting because of long-term benefits 
that these particular betrayals would convey.  Interestingly, for bad outcomes, it was 
also in the vignettes that targeted Loyalty that participants were most likely to find the 
unconflicted protagonist (in this case, the one who did not even try to remain loyal) 
more moral.  It may be that being true to oneself by pursuing advantageous 
opportunities in an athletic or professional career is seen as a moral choice, despite the 
conflict with group loyalty.   
Responses in the Authority domain were more similar to those in the Purity 
domain, falling between those in the Loyalty and individualizing domains.  The 
Authority vignettes involved running a red light (in the middle of the night, with no one 
around) and cutting in line.  There were no significant differences in responding across 
the two types of vignettes in any sample.  As expected, most participants found the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral; what is intriguing is that they were less likely to 
do so in the Authority domain than in the Care and Fairness domains.  Although this 
could reflect the different values placed on authority across the political spectrum 
(Frimer et al., 2013), the differences in judgment between conservatives and liberals 
were not large, with p-values of .04 ≤ ps ≤ .05, thus not significant at the p < .01 set a 
priori for post hoc analyses.  It could also be due to the operationalizing of “authority” 
in the vignettes: to avoid confounds with the Loyalty domain, authority figures (such as 
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law enforcement officers) were avoided in favor of running a red light and cutting in 
line.  Future research is needed to explore how respect for authority may influence the 
value placed on moral striving vs. lack of temptation. 
It is worth noting that although there were significant differences in moral 
judgment between most domains in the good outcome vignettes, this was not true for 
the bad outcome vignettes.  When it came to doing the wrong thing, participants 
overwhelmingly found the protagonists who tried to resist temptation more moral, and 
the only significant differences between domains was for Loyalty: in all other domains, 
participants were equally unlikely to find the unconflicted protagonists more moral.  As 
discussed above, it may be that some people find it more moral to be true to oneself 
when it comes to personal growth (e.g., moving on to a better job or more competitive 
sports team).  In general, however, it does not seem surprising that people find it more 
moral to at least have tried to resist temptation.  Importantly, however, there were 
participants who found the protagonists who did wrong without trying to overcome 
temptation more moral.  Identifying traits that might be related to this choice—and to 
the differences in moral judgment in the good outcome scenarios—was the purpose of 
Study 2. 
Study 2 
Although results from Study 1 suggested less variation in preferences for 
striving than had been expected, there were nonetheless individual differences in 
responses to the different vignettes.  The purpose of Study 2 was to test whether 
preferences for striving vs. lack of temptation relate to individual differences in 
personality, morality, and other relevant constructs. 
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Participants and Procedure 
The same participants from Study 1 participated in this experiment.  Data 
collection was simultaneous for all three studies; after completing the vignette exercise, 
participants completed a subset of the questionnaires described below.  In the 
undergraduate sample (N = 441), questionnaires were divided between Parts 1 and 2 of 
the survey.  For the Web sample (N = 186), participants completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire only. 
Instrumentation 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire.  Developed to measure the extent to which 
participants value the five moral domains, the MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) consists of 
two sections with different formats, each of which contains 3 items for each domain 
plus on filler question.  The first section asks participants to indicate how relevant 
certain things are when they make decisions between right and wrong, for example: 
“whether or not someone suffered emotionally” or “whether or not someone showed a 
lack of loyalty.”  Responses are on a 6-point scale ranging from not at all relevant (1) to 
extremely relevant (6).  In the second section, participants indicate their agreement to 
states such as “Respect for authority is something all children need to learn,” and 
“Justice is the most important requirement for a society,” scored on a 6-point Likert-
type scale (strongly disagree [0] to strongly agree [6]).  To improve internal 
consistency reliability, two items were dropped from the Care subscale, and one was 
dropped from the Fairness subscale (see Appendix B).  See Table 5 for means and 
internal consistency reliability for all scale scores and Appendix B for item content and 
response format details. 
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Table 5 
 
Internal consistency reliabilities, means, standard deviations, and skew for all self-
report scales. 
 Source α M SD Skew 
Undergraduate sample     
MFQ Carea Graham et al., 2011 .73 4.71 0.76 neg 
MFQ Fairnessb Graham et al., 2011 .72 4.66 0.73 neg 
MFQ Authority Graham et al., 2011 .65 4.18 0.72 neg 
MFQ Loyalty Graham et al., 2011 .69 3.99 0.80 none 
MFQ Purity Graham et al., 2011 .72 3.95 0.88 neg 
Openness John et al., 1991; 2008 .77 3.35 0.56 none 
Conscientiousness John et al., 1991; 2008 .78 3.61 0.53 none 
Extraversion John et al., 1991; 2008 .86 3.22 0.72 none 
Agreeableness John et al., 1991; 2008 .75 3.77 0.50 none 
Neuroticism John et al., 1991; 2008 .82 3.06 0.73 none 
Integrity 
Black & Reynolds, 
2016 
.86 3.94 0.55 none 
Moral Self 
Black & Reynolds, 
2016 
.76 4.16 0.44 neg 
Moral Agency Black, 2016 .86 3.93 0.45 none 
Machiavellianism Dahling et al., 2009 .83 2.35 0.60 none 
Need for Cognition 
Cacioppo & Petty, 
1980 
.86 3.20 0.59 none 
Ambiguity Tolerance McLain, 1993; 2009 .78 4.42 0.71 none 
Imaginative Resistance Black & Barnes, 2017 .89 2.81 0.67 none 
Web sample     
MFQ Care a Graham et al., 2011 .74 4.93 0.82 neg 
MFQ Fairnessb Graham et al., 2011 .68 4.85 0.73 neg 
MFQ Authority Graham et al., 2011 .72 3.51 0.95 none 
MFQ Loyalty Graham et al., 2011 .71 3.48 0.89 none 
MFQ Purity Graham et al., 2011 .82 3.13 1.16 none 
Note. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) is answered on a 6-point scale; 
Ambiguity tolerance is answered on a 7-point scale; all others were 5-point scales.  
aTwo items were dropped from the MFQ Care subscale; bOne item was dropped from 
the MFQ Fairness subscale. neg = negative. 
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Big Five Inventory.  (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & 
Soto, 2008).  Personality was assessed according to the Big Five model, using 44 items 
prefaced by “I am someone who…”  (e.g., “is talkative”; “gets nervous easily”; “does 
things efficiently”) and answered on a 5-point Likert scale.  The five personality factors 
assessed are Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
and Neuroticism.  John and colleagues report internal consistency reliabilities ranging 
from rα = .79 to rα = .90, and mean test-retest reliability of r = .74.  See Table 5 for 
internal consistency reliability in this research. 
Moral Identity Questionnaire.  The two subscales of the Moral Identity 
Questionnaire (MIQ; Black & Reynolds, 2016) were used to measure Integrity (12 
items) and Moral self (8 items).  Answer choices are on a 6-point Likert-type scale 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree) to items such as “It is important for me to treat 
other people fairly,” and “If no one is watching or will know it does not matter if I do 
the right thing.”  Black and Reynolds reported internal consistency reliabilities of .84 ≤ 
rα ≤ .86 (Moral Self) and .87 ≤ rα ≤ .89 (Integrity).  See Table 5 for details. 
Moral Agency Scale.  The 15-item Moral Agency Scale (MAS; Black, 2016) 
assesses perceived control over morally relevant actions with items such as “No one can 
make me do something I know to be wrong,” and “I feel responsible for the 
consequences of my actions,” that are answered on a 5-point Likert scale.  Internal 
consistency was rα = .80 and rα = .85 in the two scale development studies, and rα = .86 
in the current research. 
Machiavellianism.  The Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; Dahling et al., 
2009) measures four traits typical of Machiavellian attitudes and behavior, amorality, 
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distrust of others, desire for control, and desire for status.  The desire for control and 
status subscales are self-oriented (e.g., “I wish to be rich and powerful someday”) and 
are therefore not used in the present research.  The amorality (e.g., “I would cheat if 
there was a low chance of getting caught”) and distrust of others (e.g., “People are only 
motivated by personal gain”) will be combined for an overall measure of 
Machiavellianism.  Answers are made on a 5-point Likert scale.  Dahling et al. reported 
internal consistency reliabilities of rα = .85 and rα = .74 respectively for the two 
subscales (see Table 5 for this study). 
Need for Cognition.  The predisposition to seek out and enjoy for activities that 
involve cognitive challenge was assessed with Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) 18-item 
Need for Cognition Scale (NCS).  Those who score high on the NCS are comfortable 
with problem-solving, including organizing and interpreting information.  Items such as 
“I would prefer complex to simple problems” and “I only think as hard as I have to.” are 
rated on a 5-point scale (extremely uncharacteristic/extremely characteristic of me).  
See Table 5. 
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance (MSTAT-II; McLain, 1993; 
2009).  Tolerance for ambiguity was measured with the 13-item MSTAT-II, a shortened 
version of the original 22-iten MSTAT-I that refines the item pool.  Items such as “I 
don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well” (reverse scored) and “I generally prefer 
novelty over familiarity” are answered on a 7-point Likert type scale (strongly disagree 
to strongly agree).  McLain (2009) reported alpha reliabilities from .79 ≤ rα ≤ .83 (rα = 
.78 here). 
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Imaginative resistance.  The 13-item Imaginative Resistance Scale (IRS; Black 
& Barnes, 2017) assesses the unwillingness or inability to entertain fictions where 
morality operates differently, or that feature immoral characters or situations.  Items 
(e.g., “I just can’t go along with a story when it violates my beliefs about morality” and 
“Being asked to imagine morally repugnant things makes me uncomfortable”) are 
answered on a 5-point Likert scale; the IRS includes three filler items.  The authors 
reported internal consistency of .91 ≤ rα ≤ .92 and test-retest reliability of rtt = .79 (rα = 
.89 in the current research). 
Data Analyses 
Power analyses and stopping rule are described in study 1.  For data exclusion, 
time spent on each questionnaire was recorded.  Data from participants who took less 
than 30 seconds on three or more questionnaires discarded. 
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare means for each scale between 
participants who select the unconflicted protagonist and those who select the conflicted 
one at the individual domain level.  For personality, logistic regression was used to 
assess the effect of each factor controlling the other four.  Because participants found 
the unconflicted protagonist more moral across domains, an overall moral conflict 
preference score was computed by summing the five domain choices (1 = conflicted, 0 
= unconflicted, such that those who found the unconflicted protagonist most moral in all 
domains scored zero, and those who found the conflicted protagonist more moral in all 
domains scored five).  Spearman’s rho was used to test for associations between overall 
moral judgment scores and individual differences in personality, morality, and related 
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variables.  Confidence intervals were calculated with bias corrected and accelerated 
bootstrapping (N = 5,000). 
The criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis was p < .05 for all hypotheses 
specified a priori.  All post hoc comparisons dependent on primary hypothesis and 
exploratory analyses specified a priori used alphas of p < .01.  For results reported from 
unspecified analyses (e.g., association of demographic variables), effects were 
considered statistically significant if p < .001.   
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Because there were differences in responses to the two vignettes in the Purity 
domain, I tested for an interaction between vignette (A vs B) and moral judgment 
(conflicted vs. unconflicted) for each outcome variable specified in the hypotheses.  
There were no significant interactions, and the direction of the relationship were the 
same, so the responses across the two vignettes were combined for the following 
analyses. 
Tables A3 – A4 in Appendix D present statistics for the association of 
demographic variables (gender, ethnicity, mother’s education, religion, and age) and 
individual differences in the constructs measured in this study.  Tables A5 and A6 in 
Appendix D present statistics for gender differences in all variables.   
In the undergraduate sample, women had higher scores in Neuroticism, as well 
as on the Moral Self and Integrity scales (ps < .001; ds ≥ 0.37; see Table A5).  Men 
scored higher in Machiavellianism (p = .001, d= 0.33).  In the Web sample, women had 
higher scores than men in the MFQ subscales of Care and Purity (ps < .01; ds ≥ 0.44).  
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There were no other gender differences.  In line with past research (e.g., Graham et al., 
2009), political orientation was associated with scores on the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire: increased liberalism was associated with higher scores in the Care and 
Fairness domains, and increased conservatism was associated with higher scores in the 
Authority, Loyalty, and Purity domains (all ps < .001; see Table A4 for details).  
Openness to experience and Need for Cognition were positively associated with greater 
liberalism (ps < .001), whereas greater imaginative resistance was correlated with 
greater conservatism (see Table A4 for details). 
Primary Analyses 
Personality.  I had predicted an association between the personality factors of 
Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism and moral 
character judgment.  No association was expected between Extraversion and moral 
character judgment.  The results for each hypothesis are summarized in Table 6; details 
can be found below.  Correlations between personality factors and all other variables 
can be found in Table A7 (Appendix D). 
Across the five domains, those who found the conflicted protagonist more moral 
tended to report higher openness to experience scores: although only one t-test was 
statistically significant (Purity domain: t(393) = 2.18, p = .030, d = 0.26), when all five 
personality factors were controlled in logistic regression models, openness significantly 
predicted preference for the conflicted protagonist in all five domains, .013 ≤ ps ≤ .044, 
odds ratios ≥ 1.55.  Those who found the unconflicted protagonist more moral in the 
Fairness domain scored higher in neuroticism than those who chose the conflicted 
protagonist as more moral (t(393) = 2.07, p = .039, d = 0.32); this relationship held in  
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Table 6 
 
Results of hypotheses regarding personality traits in Study 2 (undergraduate sample). 
Personality factor Result 
Openness to experience 
Confirmed: Controlling for other personality factors, 
participants who preferred the conflicted protagonist 
scored higher in Openness to Experience in all five 
domains 
Conscientiousness 
Only true in the Loyalty domain, where participants who 
reported greater conscientiousness found the unconflicted 
protagonist more moral.  No association was found in the 
other domains 
Agreeableness 
Not confirmed: agreeableness was not related to moral 
judgment. 
Neuroticism 
Only true in the Fairness and Loyalty domains, where 
participants who scored higher in Neuroticism preferred 
the unconflicted character when all personality factors 
were controlled. 
Extraversion 
As expected, extraversion was not related to moral 
judgment 
Note. N = 441.  Non-directional associations between moral character judgment and 
all personality factors expect extraversion had been predicted. 
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the logistic regression model, controlling for all five personality factors (Wald Χ2 = 
6.07, p = .014, odds ratio = 0.56).  Neuroticism was also associated with a preference 
for the unconflicted protagonist in the Loyalty domain in the logistic regression model 
(Wald Χ2 = 5.64, p = .018, odds ratio = 0.67).  Conscientiousness was the strongest 
predictor of moral judgment in the Loyalty domain (more conscientious people found 
the unconflicted protagonist more moral, t(393) = 2.61, p = .010, d = 0.28, Wald Χ2 = 
7.53, p = .006, odds ratio = 0.53). 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire.  All tests of the association between scores 
on the MFQ and moral judgment were exploratory.  The pattern of results suggested 
that scores in the binding domains of Authority, Loyalty, and Purity tend to be higher in 
participants who prefer the unconflicted character across domains.  For details, see 
Table 7 (undergraduates) and Table 8 (Web sample). 
Moral judgment was most reliably related to scores on the binding foundations 
subscales: in all cases where the association was statistically significant, participants 
who found the unconflicted character more moral had higher scores in the MFQ 
Authority, Loyalty, and Purity domains (0.29 ≤ ds ≤ 0.66).  In the undergraduate 
sample, higher scores in the binding foundation subscales were significantly associated 
with preference for the unconflicted protagonist in all domains, with the exception of 
Authority, where the difference was not significant at p <.05 for scores on the Loyalty 
and Purity subscales.  In the Web sample, the differences in scores were significant only 
in the domains of Loyalty and Purity.  Scores on the MFQ individualizing subscales 
were not as predictive of moral judgment.  Higher scores on the Fairness subscale were 
associated with preference for the unconflicted protagonists in the domains of Fairness  
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Table 7 
 
Undergraduate sample: Comparisons between scores on Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire subscales for participants who found the conflicted vs. unconflicted 
protagonists more moral, 
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t p d 
Care        
MFQ Care 73 321 4.62 (0.71) 5.33 (4.37) 1.13 .261 0.15 
MFQ Fairness 73 321 4.54 (0.72) 4.69 (0.73) 1.60 .111 0.21 
MFQ Authority 73 321 3.96 (0.66) 4.23 (0.73) 2.90 .004 0.39 
MFQ Loyalty 73 321 3.80 (0.76) 4.04 (0.80) 2.31 .021 0.30 
MFQ Purity 73 321 3.70 (0.87) 4.01 (0.87) 2.73 .007 0.35 
Fairness        
MFQ Care 52 342 4.46 (0.72) 4.74 (0.75) 2.53 .012 0.38 
MFQ Fairness 52 342 4.45 (0.70) 4.69 (0.73) 2.28 .023 0.34 
MFQ Authority 52 342 3.83 (0.72) 4.24 (0.71) 3.84 < .001 0.57 
MFQ Loyalty 52 342 3.67 (0.90) 4.04 (0.77) 3.20 .001 0.45 
MFQ Purity 52 342 3.53 (0.76) 4.02 (0.88) 3.82 < .001 0.60 
Authority        
MFQ Care 104 290 4.62 (0.77) 4.74 (0.75) 1.36 .176 0.15 
MFQ Fairness 104 290 4.49 (0.73) 4.72 (0.72) 2.75 .006 0.31 
MFQ Authority 104 290 4.03 (0.66) 4.24 (0.74) 2.61 .009 0.31 
MFQ Loyalty 104 290 3.88 (0.76) 4.03 (0.81) 1.69 .093 0.20 
MFQ Purity 104 290 3.81 (0.91) 4.00 (0.86) 1.94 .053 0.22 
Loyalty        
MFQ Care 132 262 4.62 (0.76) 4.75 (0.75) 1.66 .098 0.18 
MFQ Fairness 132 262 4.62 (0.72) 4.68 (0.74) 0.78 .438 0.08 
MFQ Authority 132 262 4.00 (0.71) 4.28 (0.72) 3.63 < .001 0.39 
MFQ Loyalty 132 262 3.81 (0.83) 4.09 (0.77) 3.35 .001 0.35 
MFQ Purity 132 262 3.76 (0.83) 4.05 (0.89) 3.05 .002 0.33 
Purity        
MFQ Care 94 300 4.64 (0.75) 4.73 (0.76) 0.96 .338 0.11 
MFQ Fairness 94 300 4.55 (0.76) 4.69 (0.72) 1.63 .104 0.19 
MFQ Authority 94 300 3.99 (0.83) 4.24 (0.68) 3.01 .003 0.34 
MFQ Loyalty 94 300 3.81 (0.90) 4.05 (0.75) 2.58 .010 0.29 
MFQ Purity 94 300 3.69 (1.01) 4.04 (0.82) 3.38 .001 0.38 
Note. N = 394 (df = 392) for all comparisons. 
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Table 8 
 
Web sample: Comparisons between scores on MFQ subscales for participants who 
found the conflicted vs. unconflicted protagonists more moral. 
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t df        p     d 
Care         
MFQ Care 25 145 4.91 (0.69) 4.96 (0.85) 0.30 168 .765 0.07 
MFQ Fairness 25 145 4.66 (0.70) 4.90 (0.71) 1.57 168 .118 0.34 
MFQ Authority 25 145 3.43 (0.96) 3.54 (0.98) 0.49 168 .626 0.11 
MFQ Loyalty 25 145 3.67 (0.76) 3.49 (0.90) 0.64 168 .526 0.15 
MFQ Purity 24 144 2.82 (1.09) 3.16 (1.16) 1.35 166 .178 0.30 
Fairness         
MFQ Care 25 144 4.89 (1.01) 4.97 (0.80) 0.44 167 .662 0.09 
MFQ Fairness 25 144 4.92 (0.78) 4.87 (0.70) -0.35 167 .730 -0.07 
MFQ Authority 25 144 3.30 (0.98) 3.56 (0.98) 1.24 167 .217 0.27 
MFQ Loyalty 25 144 3.32 (1.03) 3.50 (0.86) 0.91 167 .362 0.19 
MFQ Purity 25 143 2.77 (1.07) 3.17 (1.16) 1.61 166 .110 0.36 
Authority         
MFQ Care 61 109 5.13 (0.66) 4.86 (0.89) -2.08 168 .038 -0.35 
MFQ Fairness 61 109 4.89 (0.63) 4.86 (0.76) -0.26 168 .794 -0.04 
MFQ Authority 61 109 3.46 (0.95) 3.56 (0.99) 0.62 168 .534 0.10 
MFQ Loyalty 61 109 3.49 (1.02) 3.46 (0.80) -0.17 168 .863 -0.03 
MFQ Purity 60 108 3.17 (1.12) 3.08 (1.17) -0.45 166 .655 -0.07 
Loyalty         
MFQ Care 81 88 4.94 (0.84) 4.97 (0.82) 0.24 167 .814 0.04 
MFQ Fairness 81 88 4.85 (0.79) 4.90 (0.64) 0.44 167 .660 0.07 
MFQ Authority 81 88 3.23 (0.88) 3.80 (0.99) 3.92 167 <.001 0.61 
MFQ Loyalty 81 88 3.31 (0.87) 3.62 (0.88) 2.26 167 .025 0.35 
MFQ Purity 81 87 2.74 (1.01) 3.46 (1.17) 4.24 166 <.001 0.66 
Purity         
MFQ Care 69 100 4.83 (0.85) 5.04 (0.80) 1.62 167 .107 0.25 
MFQ Fairness 69 100 4.87 (0.79) 4.88 (0.65) 0.03 167 .975 <0.01 
MFQ Authority 69 100 3.30 (0.97) 3.68 (0.96) 2.46 167 .015 0.38 
MFQ Loyalty 69 100 3.26 (0.86) 3.62 (0.88) 2.65 167 .009 0.42 
MFQ Purity 69 99 2.73 (1.06) 3.38 (1.15) 3.69 166 <.001 0.58 
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(p = .023, d = 0.34) and Authority (p = .006, d = 0.31) in the undergraduate sample.  
Higher scores on the Care subscale were associated with preference for the unconflicted 
protagonist in the Fairness domain (p = .012, d = 0.38) in the undergraduate sample, and 
with preference for the conflicted protagonist in the Authority domain (p = .038, d = 
0.35) in Web sample.   
Integrity and Moral Self.  I had expected greater self-reported integrity to be 
associated with a preference for the unconflicted character across domains; this was 
only partially supported.  Similarly, I had predicted that higher scores on the moral self 
scale would be associated with a preference for the unconflicted character across 
domains; this was also partially supported.  Participants who found the unconflicted 
protagonist more moral tended to report greater integrity (0.08 ≤ d ≤ 0.26) and moral 
self (0.12 ≤ d ≤ 0.26).  However, the difference was only statistically significant in the 
Care domain (see Table 9 for details on all variables with at least one comparison where 
p < .10). 
Moral Agency.  Self-reported moral agency was expected to be related to moral 
character judgment in all domains, good and bad outcomes.  Contrary to this hypothesis, 
there were no differences in self-reported moral agency across moral character 
preferences in any of the domains in vignettes with good outcomes (-0.02 ≤ d ≤ 0.08), 
or in vignettes with bad outcomes for all but the Purity domain, where participants who 
found the conflicted protagonist more moral than the unconflicted protagonist scored 
higher in Moral Agency (t(364) = 2.56, p = .025, d = 0.40). 
Machiavellianism.  Hypotheses regarding Machiavellianism were made only 
with regard to vignettes with bad outcomes: higher scores on the Machiavellianism  
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Table 9 
 
Comparisons between those who preferred the conflicted vs. the unconflicted 
protagonists in good outcome vignettes for scores in Integrity, Moral Self, Moral 
Agency, Need for Cognition, and Imaginative Resistance.  
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t df p d 
Care         
Integrity 80 361 3.82 (0.58) 3.97 (0.54) 2.14 439 .033 0.26 
Moral Self 80 361 4.07 (0.45) 4.18 (0.44) 2.12 439 .035 0.26 
Moral Agency 73 322 3.94 (0.44) 3.93 (0.45) 0.18 393 .858 -0.02 
Need for Cognition 73 320 3.24 (0.62) 3.19 (0.59) 0.67 391 .503 -0.09 
Imaginative Resistance 71 320 2.62 (0.61) 2.85 (0.68) 2.66 389 .008 0.36 
Fairness         
Integrity 55 386 3.82 (0.53) 3.96 (0.55) 1.71 439 .089 0.25 
Moral Self 55 386 4.07 (0.44) 4.18 (0.44) 1.66 439 .097 0.24 
Moral Agency 53 342 3.91 (0.46) 3.93 (0.45) 0.31 393 .759 0.04 
Need for Cognition 52 341 3.29 (0.56) 3.19 (0.60) 1.20 391 .230 -0.18 
Imaginative Resistance 52 339 2.54 (0.61) 2.85 (0.67) 3.13 389 .002 0.48 
Authority         
Integrity 114 327 3.88 (0.56) 3.96 (0.55) 1.33 439 .185 0.14 
Moral Self 114 327 4.11 (0.47) 4.18 (0.43) 1.38 439 .170 0.15 
Moral Agency 104 291 3.91 (0.46) 3.94 (0.45) 0.49 393 .621 0.06 
Need for Cognition 104 289 3.24 (0.61) 3.19 (0.59) 0.82 391 .415 -0.09 
Imaginative Resistance 102 289 2.76 (0.63) 2.82 (0.69) 0.89 389 .377 0.10 
Loyalty         
Integrity 148 293 3.91 (0.54) 3.96 (0.56) 0.80 439 .425 0.08 
Moral Self 148 293 4.12 (0.43) 4.18 (0.45) 1.37 439 .171 0.14 
Moral Agency 132 263 3.92 (0.46) 3.93 (0.45) 0.37 393 .714 0.04 
Need for Cognition 131 262 3.23 (0.60) 3.19 (0.59) 0.59 391 .557 -0.06 
Imaginative Resistance 130 261 2.78 (0.62) 2.82 (0.70) 0.49 389 .626 0.05 
Purity         
Integrity 102 339 3.86 (0.52) 3.97 (0.56) 1.73 439 .084 0.20 
Moral Self 102 339 4.12 (0.44) 4.18 (0.44) 1.09 439 .278 0.12 
Moral Agency 95 300 3.90 (0.45) 3.94 (0.45) 0.71 393 .477 0.08 
Need for Cognition 94 299 3.34 (0.56) 3.16 (0.60) 2.56 391 .011 -0.31 
Imaginative Resistance 92 299 2.61 (0.70) 2.87 (0.66) 3.23 389 .001 0.38 
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scale was predicted to be associated with preferences for the unconflicted character 
across domains.  This was partially supported: participants who found the unconflicted 
protagonist—who did not even think about doing the right thing—more moral in the 
bad outcome vignettes scored higher on the Machiavellianism scale (0.06 ≤ d ≤ 0.75).  
The largest effects were for Fairness and Purity vignettes; the difference was not 
significant in the Authority and Loyalty domains.  See Table 10 for bad outcome 
analyses details. 
Ambiguity Tolerance.  Participants who found the conflicted protagonist more 
moral were expected to report greater tolerance for ambiguity (good outcomes).  This 
was not confirmed.  Self-reported Ambiguity Tolerance was not related to moral 
character judgment in any domain (ps > .350).   
Need for Cognition.  Participants who found the conflicted character more 
moral were predicted to report greater need for cognition.  This hypothesis was partially 
supported: participants who found the conflicted protagonist more moral tended to self-
report greater need for cognition (0.06 ≤ d ≤ 0.31).  However, the difference was only 
statistically significant in the Purity domain (see Table 9).  For the bad outcome 
vignettes, participants in the Authority domain who found the conflicted protagonist 
more moral had significantly higher scores in need for cognition than those who 
preferred the unconflicted protagonist (t(364) = 2.10, p = .036, d = 0.45; see Table 10 
for details). 
Imaginative resistance.  Participants who preferred the unconflicted 
protagonists across domains were expected to self-report greater imaginative resistance:  
this was partially confirmed.  Participants who found the unconflicted protagonist more  
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Table 10 
 
Comparisons between those who preferred the conflicted vs. the unconflicted 
protagonists in bad outcome vignettes for scores in Machiavellianism, Integrity, 
Moral Self, Moral Agency, and Need for Cognition.  
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t df p d 
Care (Harm)      
Machiavellianism 341 25 2.29 (0.59) 2.60 (0.68) 2.48 364 .014 -0.48 
Integrity 342 25 3.98 (0.53) 3.94 (0.56) 0.39 365 .699 0.08 
Moral Self 342 25 4.20 (0.40) 4.19 (0.38) 0.15 365 .878 0.03 
Moral Agency 342 25 3.98 (0.42) 3.99 (0.48) 0.12 365 .902 0.02 
Need for Cognition 341 25 3.21 (0.59) 3.42 (0.68) 1.74 364 .083 0.34 
Fairness (Cheating)       
Machiavellianism 341 25 2.28 (0.59) 2.73 (0.60) 3.66 364 < .001 -0.75 
Integrity 342 25 4.00 (0.54) 3.74 (0.38) 2.37 365 .018 0.56 
Moral Self 342 25 4.20 (0.40) 4.12 (0.37) 1.06 365 .289 0.23 
Moral Agency 342 25 3.99 (0.42) 3.85 (0.46) 1.54 365 .125 0.31 
Need for Cognition 341 25 3.24 (0.60) 3.02 (0.56) 1.71 364 .088 0.37 
Authority (Subversion)       
Machiavellianism 337 29 2.30 (0.58) 2.49 (0.82) 1.67 364 .095 -0.27 
Integrity 338 29 4.00 (0.53) 3.80 (0.57) 1.85 365 .066 0.35 
Moral Self 338 29 4.20 (0.40) 4.15 (0.34) 0.71 365 .480 0.15 
Moral Agency 338 29 3.98 (0.42) 3.89 (0.49) 1.09 365 .277 0.20 
Need for Cognition 337 29 3.24 (0.61) 3.00 (0.46) 2.10 364 .036 0.45 
Loyalty (Betrayal)       
Machiavellianism 312 54 2.31 (0.60) 2.35 (0.60) 0.42 364 .674 -0.06 
Integrity 313 54 3.97 (0.54) 4.04 (0.48) 0.92 365 .360 -0.14 
Moral Self 313 54 4.18 (0.39) 4.28 (0.42) 1.76 365 .080 -0.25 
Moral Agency 313 54 3.98 (0.43) 3.98 (0.40) 0.05 365 .964 0.01 
Need for Cognition 312 54 3.21 (0.59) 3.31 (0.65) 1.19 364 .234 -0.17 
Purity (Degradation)       
Machiavellianism 332 33 2.28 (0.56) 2.70 (0.68) 3.96 363 < .001 -0.67 
Integrity 333 33 3.99 (0.53) 3.90 (0.62) 0.91 364 .365 0.15 
Moral Self 333 33 4.19 (0.40) 4.27 (0.38) 1.12 364 .262 -0.21 
Moral Agency 333 33 3.99 (0.42) 3.82 (0.44) 2.56 364 .025 0.40 
Need for Cognition 332 33 3.22 (0.61) 3.18 (0.50) 0.37 363 .713 0.07 
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moral (good outcomes) reported greater imaginative resistance (0.05 ≤ d ≤ 0.48).  
However, the differences were not statistically significant for the Authority and Loyalty 
domains; see Table 9 for details. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
Overall moral character judgment was significantly correlated with Authority, 
Loyalty, Purity, Openness to Experience, and Imaginative Resistance.  In the 
undergraduate sample, choosing the unconflicted protagonist as more moral was related 
to greater Respect for Authority (Spearman’s  = -.25, 99% CI [-.37, -.12]), Loyalty (rs 
= -.22 [-.34, -.09]), Purity (rs = -.24 [-.37, -.12]), and Imaginative Resistance (rs = -.15 [-
.28, -.02]).  Choosing the conflicted protagonist as more moral was correlated with 
greater Openness, rs = .15 [.02, 0.29].  In the Web sample, preference for the 
unconflicted protagonist was significantly related to higher scores in Authority (rs = -.27 
[-.45, -.07]) and Purity (rs = -.29 [-.48, -.07]).  No other correlation was significant at p 
< .01; see Table 11 for all effects with p-values less than .05. 
Discussion 
In general, hypotheses regarding the association of moral character judgment 
and individual differences in potentially related constructs were not confirmed.  The 
exceptions were those concerning openness to experience, which was associated with 
finding the conflicted protagonist more moral in all domains (the only case where the 
hypotheses were fully confirmed), and imaginative resistance, which was related to 
preferences for the unconflicted protagonist in the domains of Care, Fairness, and 
Purity.  Overall moral character judgment scores (summed across domains) were also 
significantly related (p < .01) to openness and imaginative resistance.  Interestingly,  
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Table 11 
 
Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between overall moral character judgment scores and 
related variables in Study 2. 
 Undergraduate Web 
  df p  df p 
MFQ Care -.10 392 .045 -.01 167 .857 
MFQ Fairness -.13 392 .011 -.01 167 .878 
MFQ Authority -.25 392 < .001 -.27 167 < .001 
MFQ Loyalty -.20 392 < .001 -.16 167 .034 
MFQ Purity -.24 392 < .001 -.29 166 < .001 
Openness .15 393 .004    
Conscientiousness -.11 393 .037    
Integrity -.12 439 .013    
Moral Self -.10 439 .038    
Imaginative 
Resistance 
-.14 389 .007    
Need for 
Cognition 
.11 391 .035    
Note. Overall moral character judgment score calculated by summing across domains (1 = 
conflicted protagonist; 0 = unconflicted protagonist) such that 0 indicates finding the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral across domains, and 5 indicates finding the conflicted 
protagonist more moral across domains. 
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individual differences on self-reported integrity, moral self, and moral agency did not 
seem related to moral character judgment.  Greater integrity and moral self, 
hypothesized to be related to choosing the unconflicted protagonist across domains, 
were only significantly related to choosing lack of conflicted in the Care domain, and 
the effect size was small.  Similarly, Need for Cognition, hypothesized to relate to 
preferences for moral conflict across domains, was only related to choosing the 
conflicted protagonist in the vignettes that targeted Purity.  The strongest relationships 
were found between moral character judgment and scores on the MFQ, which were 
related to choices in the individual domains as well as to overall scores (choosing the 
unconflicted protagonist meant higher scores in Authority, Loyalty, and Purity).  
Although treated as exploratory analyses, these results lend credence to the choice of 
vignettes and support Moral Foundation Theory, which holds that people base moral 
judgment on the different domains. 
Given the generous sample size and multiple comparisons, it is unlikely that any 
missed effects would be large enough to be meaningful; indeed, the significant results 
that did obtain should be viewed with some caution.  However, there were still 
interesting results, discussed in detail below, and the lack of association seen here does 
not prove a lack of relationship between morality and moral character judgment; rather 
it suggests the need for more research to explore potential effects in distinct scenarios 
with greater context and different targeted moral behavior. 
Personality.  Of the five personality factors, only Openness to experience was 
reliably related to moral character judgment: across the five domains (controlling for the 
other four factors), openness to experience predicted a preference for moral striving.  
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Past research had shown an association between personality and scores on the MFQ 
subscales (Graham et al., 2011, 2012; Hirsch et al., 2010) and other moral constructs 
(Black et al., 2017; Habashi, et al., 2016), with the exception of extraversion (this non-
relationship was confirmed by the current results).  This was particularly true of the 
“moral personality” factors of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness 
(McFerran et al., 2010); here, however, only openness was related to moral judgment in 
all domains.  This may reflect a greater willingness to consider potential situations 
where it may be necessary to break moral taboos or go against conventional norms (see 
Black et al., 2017 who reported a positive correlation between moral permissibility and 
openness to experience).  People who are open to experience may also value the 
willingness to think critically about each morally relevant situation as it presents and to 
learn from mistakes (Davis et al., 2015; Facione, Sanchez, Facione, & Gainen, 1995).  
In the Loyalty domain, both Conscientiousness and Neuroticism also predicted moral 
judgment; higher scores in both were associated with a preference for the unconflicted 
protagonist.  Given that Loyalty was the domain for which participants were most likely 
to prefer the character who had to strive to be good, it seems that personality may play a 
larger role in character judgment here than in the other moral domains.  It was 
somewhat surprising that Agreeableness, often associated with morality (McFerran et 
al.; Walker, 2010), was not related to moral character judgment in this research.  
However, Hirsh and colleagues (2010) found that the relation of agreeableness to MFQ 
scales depended on the type of agreeableness measured, with compassion being 
positively related to Care and Fairness whereas politeness was related to Authority.  To 
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the extent that moral judgment may reflect political orientation, such past research 
explains the lack of effect of agreeableness here. 
Moral Foundations Theory.  The analyses of the association of MFQ scores 
and moral character judgment were exploratory, and results differed across the two 
samples, with effect sizes being much stronger in the undergraduate sample.  In general, 
participants who found the unconflicted protagonist more moral scored higher on all the 
MFQ subscales, across domains of moral judgment, suggesting that in general, people 
who prefer lack of moral conflict place greater value on all the moral foundations, but 
particularly the binding ones.  The only exception was in the Web sample, where 
participants who preferred the conflicted candidate scored higher on the MFQ Care 
subscale (d = 0.35, p = .038).  This difference was not statistically significant at p < .01 
(the criterion for exploratory analyses—in itself liberal considering the number of 
analyses); however, it is worth noting that Frimer et al. (2013) found that liberals—who 
score higher on the MFQ individualizing subscales—actually found behavior 
exemplifying the Authority domain less moral when judging moral exemplars.  As such, 
this effect might be worthy of further exploration.   
These results (strongest in the politically conservative undergraduate sample) 
are in line with the hypotheses regarding moral character judgment across domains: 
people who judged the unconflicted protagonists most moral tended to score higher on 
the MFQ binding domains.  It may be that although the moral domain does not alter the 
overall preference for lack of conflict (virtue rather than striving), individual differences 
in the extent to which people base their judgment on the different foundations do affect 
preference for striving.  For example, in the undergraduate sample, selecting the 
 65 
unconflicted protagonist as more moral was significantly associated with higher scores 
on the MFQ subscale for all vignettes. 
Other moral constructs.  Imaginative resistance, which refers to the reluctance 
to engage with morally deviant fictional worlds and has been associated with morality 
in prior research (Black & Barnes, 2017; Black & Barnes, in preparation), was related 
to moral judgment in the domains of Care, Fairness, and Purity (ds ≥ 0.36).  
Unsurprisingly, given the strong correlation between Purity and Imaginative Resistance 
(Black & Barnes, 2017), people who self-reported greater imaginative resistance found 
the unconflicted protagonists more moral.  Black and Barnes suggested that imaginative 
resistance reflects fear of moral contagion, and given that immoral fictional acts are 
carried out precisely by protagonists (or antagonists), it could be that the same fear of 
contagion that keeps people from engaging with fictional worlds makes them less likely 
to appreciate any temptation to act immorally in supposedly real people, even those 
described in brief vignettes such as those used in this research (see also Stueber, 2011). 
Contrary to expectations, integrity, moral self, and moral agency were not 
related to moral character judgment in scenarios in which the protagonist ultimately 
behaved in a moral fashion.  Preference for the unconflicted character in the Care 
domain was associated with higher scores in Integrity and Moral Self, but given the 
small effect sizes and multiple analyses, p-values greater than .03 do not provide good 
evidence of a reliable effect.  This was most surprising in the domain of Fairness, where 
judging the morality of someone fairly distributing money would seem an important 
reflection of integrity.  It may be that judging others’ moral character may not reflect 
self-oriented (and reported) evaluations of morality.  Given that the scenarios targeted 
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the domains described in Moral Foundations Theory (and scores on MFQ scales were 
related to moral character judgment), it could also be that judgment of moral character 
depends more on the type of behavior (and domain-specific values) than on general 
moral traits such as sense of moral self and integrity. 
It should be noted that whereas scores on the Imaginative Resistance Scale 
(Black & Barnes, 2017) and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) 
have been associated with political orientation, scores on the Moral Identity 
Questionnaire (used to assess integrity and moral self here; Black & Reynolds, 2016) 
and the Moral Agency Scale (Black, 2016) do not seem to reflect politics (this was also 
true in this sample; see Tables A3 and A4 for details).  Once again, these results, 
especially contrasting the two samples, suggest an important role for politics in moral 
judgment.  That said, the overwhelming preference was still for lack of moral conflict in 
these particular domains (and the vignettes chosen to target them). 
Need for Cognition and Ambiguity Tolerance.  Contrary to expectations, need 
for cognition and ambiguity tolerance were not related to moral judgment in the 
domains tested here.  There were no effects for ambiguity tolerance; if indeed 
individuals who have greater tolerance for ambiguity (and theoretically are more 
comfortable with complex situations) felt more comfortable with the uncertainty of the 
conflicted character, they did not subsequently value moral striving.  Need for cognition 
was only related to moral judgment in the Purity domain.  These results were more 
surprising considering that the most reliable significant effect was the association of 
greater openness to experience with preferences for moral striving.  Both need for 
cognition and tolerance for ambiguity are essential facets of openness to experience 
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(McCrae & Costa, 1997), and openness has been positively correlated with both need 
for cognition (e.g., Madrid & Patterson, 2016; the correlation was r(437) = .54, p < .001 
in this study) and ambiguity tolerance (Bardi, Guerra, & Ramdeny, 2009; r(438) = .40, 
p < .001 in this study).  Thus the lack of association amongst need for cognition, 
ambiguity tolerance, and moral character judgment was particularly intriguing, 
suggesting on the one hand that participants may not have found the moral behavior 
portrayed in the vignettes particularly ambiguous or complex, and on the other, that 
such scenarios simply are not amongst the tasks that effectively detect differences in 
need for cognition and ambiguity tolerance. 
Although most of the relationships between moral character judgment and 
individual differences in various constructs were not statistically significant, two sets of 
effects stood out.  Openness to experience was related to moral character judgment 
across domains.  Imaginative resistance was related to finding the unconflicted 
protagonist more moral in the domains of Care, Fairness, and Purity.  Given that both 
openness and imaginative resistance are associated with fiction (e.g., Barnes & Black, 
2017, in preparation; Mar et al., 2009), Study 3 was run to assess potential correlations 
between reading exposure and moral character judgment. 
Study 3 
Unexpectedly, moral character judgment was not related to ambiguity tolerance 
and need for cognition, both constructs that have been related to fiction exposure 
(Djikic et al., 2013).  However, engagement with fiction could be related to moral 
character judgment for a variety of reasons.  For example, openness to experience, 
which was associated with preferences for striving in all five domains in Study 2, has 
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been positively correlated with fiction exposure in prior research (e.g., Mar, Oatley, & 
Peterson, 2009).  Moreover, reading in general, and fiction in particular, offers readers a 
unique perspective on the interior lives of other people (fictional characters or real 
people, in the case of narrative nonfiction) that encourages thinking about others’ 
thoughts and intentions (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Oatley, 2016).  As such, the purpose of 
Study 3 was to explore the association between moral character judgment in the 
different domains and lifetime exposure to fiction and nonfiction, as assessed using an 
author recognition measure. 
Method 
The same participants who completed Study 1 participated in this experiment (N 
= 441 for undergraduate sample and N = 186 for Web sample).  As with Study 2, data 
collection was integrated with Study 1, with all reading exposure tests (described 
below) included with the questionnaires that followed the vignettes.  For the 
undergraduate sample, separate author recognition tests were presented in surveys 1 and 
2. 
Instrumentation 
Fiction exposure.  Lifetime exposure to fiction was assessed with two tests, the 
Genre Familiarity Test (GFT; Black et al., 2017) and the Young Adult Fiction Test 
(YAFT).  Both tests are based on the Author Recognition Test paradigm, introduced by 
Stanovich and West (1989): participants are presented with lists of real and fake author 
names, and asked to select only those they are certain are authors of books.  Author 
name recognition is assumed to occur not only for books people have read, but for 
similar books, shelved according to genre in book stores and suggested based on 
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purchasing behavior on Internet sites such as Amazon.com.  Foils are used to control for 
guessing (45 for GFT, from Acheson et al., 2008; 42 for YAFT, from Mar, Oatley, 
Hirsch, de la Paz, & Peterson, 2006).  Author checklists avoid the socially desirable 
responding that can result from asking participants how many books they read, and 
prior research has shown performance on author recognition tests to be associated with 
book purchasing behavior (Rain & Mar, 2014).  
The GFT includes seven genres, each represented by 15 names of authors who 
write exclusively or primarily in that genre: Classical, Contemporary Literary, Fantasy, 
Horror, Mystery/Thriller, Romance, and Science Fiction.  Black and colleagues report 
alpha values ranging from .81 ≤ rα ≤ .91 for the individual genres.  To more accurately 
assess the leisure reading behavior of college undergraduates, who have only recently 
reached the age of majority, the OU sample was also presented with a list of Young 
Adult fiction authors.  The YAFT includes 108 names of authors who have written 
either a bestselling YA novel, or at least three YA novels, and have not written for 
adults.  Author names that had zero variance or a negative or low (r < .200) corrected 
item-total correlation were dropped (details in Appendix B).  See Table 12 for 
descriptive statistics and internal consistency reliability for all author recognition tests. 
Nonfiction exposure.  Lifetime exposure to nonfiction was measured with the 
nonfiction section of Mar and colleagues (2006) adaptation of Stanovich and West’s 
(1989) ART.  The ART-M includes 50 names of nonfiction authors; Mar et al. reported 
internal consistency reliability of rα = .90.  Black and Barnes (in preparation) found 
lower reliability of rα = .78, possibly due to outdated author names.  The instrument was 
adapted by eliminating authors who also write fiction, adding best-selling narrative  
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Table 12 
 
Internal consistency reliability, mean, standard deviation, and range for all author 
checklists used to assess reading exposure. 
 Source α M SD Range 
Undergraduate sample     
Young Adult Fiction Black & Barnes .94 4.46 5.59 52 
Classics Black et al., 2017 .83 4.46 3.25 14 
Contemporary Literary Black et al., 2017 .72 0.31 0.76 7 
Fantasya Black et al., 2017 .84 0.10 0.47 7 
Historicala Black et al., 2017 .84 0.10 0.38 4 
Horrora Black et al., 2017 .84 0.11 0.45 5 
Mystery/Thrillera Black et al., 2017 .73 0.25 0.72 9 
Romancea Black et al., 2017 .79 0.22 0.72 7 
Science Fictiona Black et al., 2017 .82 0.19 0.65 6 
Nonfiction Mar et al., 2006 .90 0.82 1.72 19 
Narrative nonfiction Self-developed .73 0.11 0.40 3 
Web Sample      
Classics Black et al., 2017 .94 8.33 4.85 15 
Contemporary Literary Black et al., 2017 .92 2.69 3.79 14 
Fantasy Black et al., 2017 .88 3.39 3.42 13 
Historical a Black et al., 2017 .75 1.01 1.63 11 
Horror a Black et al., 2017 .63 0.62 1.13 9 
Mystery/Thriller Black et al., 2017 .88 3.71 3.52 15 
Romance Black et al., 2017 .86 1.78 2.56 14 
Science Fiction Black et al., 2017 .89 2.32 3.10 13 
Nonfiction Mar et al., 2006 .93 5.13 6.08 31 
Narrative nonfiction Self-developed .66 0.44 0.91 5 
Note. aAuthor names with zero variance or corrected item-total correlations that were 
negative or less than .150 were not included.  All variables but Classics in the Web sample 
were positively skewed. 
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nonfiction authors from the last five years, and discarding the ten “Business” authors, 
whom few people recognized in recent data collections (Black & Barnes, unpublished 
data).  Science, psychology, philosophy, sociopolitical commentary, and self-help books 
may discuss morally relevant themes and were therefore maintained as examples of 
non-narrative fiction.  Author names were dropped as necessary according to the criteria 
detailed above for fiction. 
Data Analyses 
All hypotheses addressing the relationship of familiarity with overall lifetime 
exposure to fiction as well as familiarity with separate genres were tested using 
independent samples t-tests (choice of conflicted vs. unconflicted protagonist).  The 
association of overall moral character judgment and reading exposure was tested with 
Spearman’s rho (author recognition variables were transformed prior to correlational 
analyses).  As with Study 2, alpha level for a priori hypotheses were p < .05; all post 
hoc comparisons used p < .01. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. 
As in Study 2, I tested for an interaction between vignette (A vs B) in the Purity 
domain and moral character judgment (conflicted vs. unconflicted) for each outcome 
variable specified in the hypotheses.  There were two signification interactions: 
Nonfiction (F(1, 437) = 5.92, p = .015, ηp2 = .013); and Narrative Nonfiction (F(1, 437) 
= 9.96, p = .002, ηp2 = .022).  For all other genres the interactions were not significant, 
and the directions of the relationships did not differ across vignettes.  In the 
undergraduate sample, women recognized more YA authors (p < .001, d = 0.61) and 
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Mystery/Thriller authors (p = .001, d= 0.30).  In the Web sample, women recognized 
more historical fiction authors (p = .006, d = 0.45) and Romance authors (p < .001, d= 
0.71).  There were no other gender differences. 
Primary Analyses 
Hypotheses.  I had expected that, across domains, greater familiarity with 
Romance and Mystery/Thriller authors would be associated with an increased tendency 
to prefer the unconflicted character; this hypothesis was not confirmed.  Participants 
who recognized more Romance authors did find the unconflicted protagonist more 
moral in the care domain (undergraduate sample; t(245) = 2.27, p = .024, d = 0.23) and 
in the Fairness domain (Web sample; tadj.(99) = 3.15, p = .002, d = 0.46), but for 
Mystery/Thriller, those who preferred the conflicted protagonist tended to recognize 
more authors, and the differences were not statistically significant (ps > .05).  On the 
other hand, I had expected familiarity with contemporary literary, fantasy, and science 
fiction authors would be associated with preferences for the conflicted character across 
domains; this was only partially confirmed.  Participants who recognized more 
Contemporary Literary, Fantasy, or Science Fiction found the conflicted protagonist 
more moral.  However, differences were only statistically significant for Literary 
Fiction in the Loyalty domain for the Web sample, Fantasy in the Loyalty domain for 
both samples, and Science Fiction in the Loyalty and Purity domains in the Web 
sample.  See Tables 13 (undergraduate) and 14 (Web) for details of all comparisons 
where p < .10. 
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Table 13 
 
Undergraduate sample. Comparisons between those who preferred the conflicted vs. 
the unconflicted protagonists in good outcome vignettes for reading exposure; only 
comparisons with p-values < .10 included.  
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t df    p d 
Care         
Romance 73 322 0.11 (0.36) 0.25 (0.77) 2.27 245a .024 -0.23 
Fairness         
Classics 53 342 3.75 (2.88) 4.56 (3.30) 1.69 393 .092 -0.26 
Authority         
Classics 104 291 5.18 (3.21) 4.20 (3.23) 2.68 393 .008 0.31 
Literary 104 291 0.46 (0.93) 0.26 (0.69) 2.31 393 .021 0.24 
Loyalty         
Fantasy 132 263 0.05 (0.24) 0.13 (0.54) 2.01 388a .046 -0.19 
Historical 132 263 0.05 (0.26) 0.12 (0.43) 1.88 380a .061 -0.18 
Purity         
Narrative nonfiction         
Vignette A 60 160 0.10 (0.35) 0.13 (0.39) 0.54 218 .588 -0.08 
Vignette B 42 179 0.31 (0.78) 0.06 (0.25) 2.08 43a .043 0.44 
Nonfiction         
Vignette A 60 160 0.52 (1.03) 1.06 (2.23) 1.82 218 .070 -0.31 
Vignette B 42 179 1.05 (2.19) 0.64 (1.12) 1.71 219 .089 0.23 
Cheating         
Classics 342 25 4.75 (3.28) 3.60 (2.22) 1.72 365 .087 0.41 
Nonfiction 342 25 0.85 (1.72) 0.16 (0.47) 5.12 87a < .001 0.55 
Degradation         
YA Fiction 333 33 4.80 (5.89) 2.33 (2.19) 2.39 364 .018 0.55 
Classics 333 33 4.84 (3.26) 2.97 (2.34) 3.21 364 .001 0.66 
Narrative 
nonfiction 
333 33 0.13 (0.41) 0.03 (0.17) 2.53 75a .013 0.30 
Note. aAdjusted for unequal variance (Levene’s test p < .01). 
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Table 14 
 
Web sample. Comparisons between those who preferred the conflicted vs. the 
unconflicted protagonists in good outcome vignettes for reading exposure; only 
comparisons with p-values < .10 included.  
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t df p d 
Care         
Classics 27 150 10.56(4.16) 8.37 (4.53) 2.33 175 .021 0.50 
Historical 27 150 1.56 (1.97) 0.86 (1.35) 2.29 175 .023 0.41 
Mystery 27 150 4.81 (3.80) 3.57 (3.35) 1.74 175 .084 0.35 
Narrative 
nonfiction 
27 150 0.78 (1.15) 0.39 (0.79) 2.19 175 .030 0.39 
Fairness         
Romance 26 150 0.96 (0.96) 1.85 (2.56) 3.15 99a .002 -0.46 
Authority         
Classics 63 114 10.24(4.15) 7.86 (4.53) 3.45 175 .001 0.55 
Literary 63 114 3.52 (3.99) 2.44 (3.63) 1.84 175 .068 0.28 
Historical 63 114 1.37 (1.70) 0.75 (1.29) 2.52 102a .013 0.41 
Mystery 63 114 4.44 (3.50) 3.39 (3.36) 1.98 175 .050 0.31 
Romance 63 114 2.14 (2.35) 1.49 (2.41) 1.74 175 .084 0.27 
Narrative 
nonfiction 
63 114 0.68 (1.01) 0.32 (0.74) 2.52 100a .013 0.41 
Loyalty         
Classics 83 93 9.90 (4.23) 7.61 (4.56) 3.44 174 .001 0.52 
Literary 83 93 3.52 (4.02) 2.22 (3.49) 2.28 164a .024 0.35 
Fantasy 83 93 4.18 (3.52) 2.94 (2.97) 2.54 174 .012 0.38 
Science Fiction 83 93 3.12 (3.37) 1.83 (2.73) 2.81 174 .006 0.42 
Narrative 
nonfiction 
83 93 0.59 (0.99) 0.32 (0.72) 2.06 174 .040 0.31 
Nonfiction 83 93 6.88 (6.50) 4.14 (5.33) 3.07 174 .002 0.46 
Purity         
Classics 71 105 9.48 (4.36) 8.16 (4.61) 1.90 174 .059 0.29 
Literary 71 105 3.48 (4.20) 2.39 (3.44) 1.81 130a .073 0.28 
Historical 71 105 1.20 (1.61) 0.81 (1.37) 1.72 174 .088 0.26 
Science Fiction 71 105 3.04 (3.28) 2.03 (2.93) 2.15 174 .033 0.33 
Narrative 
nonfiction 
71 105 0.59 (1.05) 0.35 (0.71) 1.81 174 .072 0.27 
Nonfiction 71 105 6.82 (6.45) 4.50 (5.60) 2.54 174 .012 0.38 
Note. aAdjusted for unequal variance (Levene’s test p < .01). 
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Research questions.  The relationship of moral character judgment and other 
genres (including nonfiction and narrative nonfiction) was tested, but no hypotheses had 
been made.  In the Web sample, participants who preferred the conflicted protagonist  
recognized more Classics authors across domains.  In the undergraduate sample, this 
was true for authority and Purity, but in the Fairness domain, those who found the 
unconflicted protagonist more moral recognized more Classics authors.  Interestingly, 
two of the more reliable effects pertained to Historical fiction and narrative nonfiction: 
for both genres, participants who found the conflicted character more moral recognized 
more authors across domains (web sample).  Recognition of nonfiction authors in 
general was associated with preference for the conflicted protagonist.  Recognition of 
YA fiction authors was only related to moral character judgment in the Purity domain 
(bad outcomes), t(362) = 2.39, p = .018, d = 0.55).  See Tables 13 and 14 for details. 
In the undergraduate sample, overall moral character judgment2 was correlated 
with Classics—people who recognized more Classis authors found the conflicted 
protagonist more moral in more domains, rs(392) = .11, 95% CI [.01, .21], but the effect 
was not significant at the level set for exploratory analyses (p = .023).  No other 
correlation approached significance (ps > .10).  In the Web sample, overall moral 
character judgment was positively correlated with exposure to Classics, Science Fiction, 
Narrative Nonfiction, and general Nonfiction (rs ≥ .22, ps ≤ .004); see A8 in Appendix 
D for details. 
                                                 
2 Choices summed across domains where 0 = participant found the unconflicted protagonist more moral 
in all five domains and 5 = participant found the conflicted protagonist more moral in all five domains. 
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Discussion 
In general, the more authors participants recognized, the more likely they were 
to find the conflicted protagonist more moral.  The only exception was the recognition 
of Romance authors, which was, as expected, associated with choosing the unconflicted 
protagonist as more moral, though only in two cases (Care domain for undergraduates 
and Fairness for Web sample).  In general, the associations between moral character 
judgment and scores on the various author recognition tasks were not statistically 
significant; however, there was a clear pattern of results, and some surprises—including 
lack of effects—that merit mention and are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
I had hypothesized that familiarity with Romance and Mystery/Thriller would be 
associated with a preference for the unconflicted protagonist across domains, and that 
familiarity with Contemporary Literary, Fantasy, and Science Fiction would relate to 
preferences for striving across domains.  Romance, when it was significantly associated 
with moral judgment, was indeed positively associated with a preference for the 
unconflicted protagonist, but this was only in the domains of Care in the undergraduate 
sample and Fairness in the Web sample.  Even given the little familiarity with authors 
demonstrated by undergraduates (Black & Barnes, unpublished data), clearly there is no 
consistent relationship between familiarity with Romance and moral character 
judgment, at least not in the types of situations represented by the vignettes targeting the 
moral foundations.   
Similarly, there was no consistent pattern of results for Contemporary Literary, 
Fantasy, or Science fiction, even in the Web sample.  Although participants who found 
moral striving more moral did tend to recognize more authors, the only domain in 
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which this was true for all three genres was Loyalty, perhaps because this was where 
participants were just as likely to prefer the conflicted protagonist.  That there may also 
be something special about either the Loyalty domain, or the way it was operationalized 
here, is clear from Study 1, where it was the domain in which participants were most 
likely to find the conflicted protagonist more moral.  In Study 3, moral character 
judgment in the Loyalty domain was related to familiarity with Classics and Nonfiction 
as well as the hypothesized Literary, Fantasy, and Science Fiction (for the Web sample). 
The exploratory analyses testing for an association between reading and moral 
character judgment suggest at best a weak association with most genres.  In general, 
participants in the Web sample who preferred the conflicted protagonist recognized 
more authors across domains (with the exception of Romance in the Fairness domain, as 
stated above).  Greater recognition of nonfiction authors was also associated with a 
preference for those who overcome temptation: in both samples, where there was a 
significant difference, participants who found the conflicted protagonist more moral 
recognized more authors in narrative and general nonfiction.3  Given the limited effects, 
and the positive correlation between openness to experience and reading exposure 
(Black & Barnes, in preparation; Mar et al., 2009), it may be that personality, more than 
familiarity with authors, is driving this effect, especially since openness to experience 
was the single most reliable predictor of moral judgment across domains. 
Interestingly, familiarity with Young Adult fiction was not related to moral 
judgment in the positive outcome scenarios.  In the bad outcome scenarios, it was only 
related to judgment in the Purity domain: participants who preferred the protagonist 
                                                 
3 In the undergraduate sample, this was in the bad outcome scenarios. 
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who tried to do the right thing (the vast majority) recognized more YA authors.  The 
YA Fiction test was developed to address the fact that undergraduates read very little in 
general, and even less adult fiction.  The only authors they tend to recognize are those 
of classics, and these may have been encountered as part of a school curriculum.  
Unfortunately, even given 108 well-known YA authors, participants in this study 
recognized a mean of only 4.46: they do not appear to be big readers or YA fiction.  As 
such, the conclusions we can draw from the lack of effects are limited.  That said, it 
may be that for domain-specific morally relevant scenarios, other factors play a greater 
role than any preference for reading entails, particularly for college-age individuals. 
General Discussion  
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate the extent to which 
individuals value striving (vs. lack of temptation) when judging moral character in 
different circumstances.  Prior research suggested that adults, unlike children, found 
children who had to overcome temptation to do the right thing more moral that those 
who did not have to resist temptation (Starmans & Bloom, 2016).  The premise of this 
investigation was that moral character judgment would depend on the circumstances: 
specifically, I hypothesized that preferences for striving would vary across the five 
moral domains described by Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 
2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007).  Study 1 tested for differences in moral character 
judgment—whether people believe striving or lack of temptation more moral—between 
moral domains.  Study 2 investigated the association of moral character judgment with 
individual differences in personality, morality, need for cognition, and ambiguity 
tolerance.  Study 3 explored potential relationships with reading exposure.  All three 
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studies employed two separate samples: college undergraduates and adults recruited 
online.   
Although the results suggest that moral judgment does vary across domain, the 
variation was not as expected: in all domains, participants found lack of temptation 
more moral, and, unexpectedly, this preference was strongest in the individualizing 
domains of Care and Fairness.  Interestingly, individual differences in personality and 
morally relevant constructs were not, on the whole, related to moral character judgment; 
the exceptions were Openness to Experience, the binding foundations of Respect for 
Authority, Loyalty, and Purity, and Imaginative Resistance.  Given the effects of 
Openness and Imaginative Resistance, it was reasonable to expect an association 
between moral character judgment and reading (Black & Barnes, 2017; Djikic et al., 
2013; Mar et al., 2009); surprisingly, evidence was limited, although in general, greater 
familiarity with authors was related to the belief that moral striving was more moral.  
This was particularly interesting in light of the overwhelming tendency for participants 
to find the unconflicted protagonist more moral in all moral domains. 
The most important takeaway from this research is that, when asked to judge 
moral character in a variety of situations, people tend to find unhesitating adherence to 
moral norms preferable to striving (successfully) to overcome temptation.  These results 
are in contrast to those reported by Starmans and Bloom (2016), who found that adult 
participants judged people who had to strive to do the right thing more moral than those 
who were not tempted.  Starmans and Bloom reasoned that adults were Kantians in that 
they valued the effort exerted to be moral, in contrast to the children in their sample, 
who in preferring the unconflicted protagonists acted as virtue theorists.  The results of 
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the current research suggest that adults too may be virtue theorists when it comes to 
judging other adults, rather than children.  This may be true, but the argument for 
Kantian deontology in adults based on the results of Starmans and Bloom’s research 
may also be flawed.  Virtue theory does not suppose that children are born virtuous in 
all ways.  Rather, although children may be born with some ‘natural virtues,’ it is only 
after the acquisition of habit through virtuous practice in childhood and practical 
wisdom through reasoning in adulthood that people fully possess virtues (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics VI).  Adults in Starmans and Bloom’s studies (and in the current 
research, for the vignette adapted from their study), found children who overcame 
temptation to do the right thing more moral than those who were not tempted.  In the 
current investigation, adults were judging adults, who had, presumably, had many years 
to recognize and practice virtue.  The vignettes used in this research presented but a 
snapshot of the protagonists’ lives that participants could take as they wished.  They 
could have understood the actions of the unconflicted (and not tempted) protagonists to 
reflect a lifetime of recognizing temptation, overcoming it, and building the moral 
character necessary to act without hesitation.   
It is important to emphasize that despite the predominant preference for 
unconflicted moral decision-making, there were significant differences in judgment 
across domains.  The fact that it was precisely in the binding domains where 
participants were most likely to disagree (and prefer striving) was unexpected, 
fascinating, and may be due to differences in values inherent in the association of 
political orientation and Moral Foundations Theory (Frimer et al., 2013; Graham et al., 
2009).  In this research, post hoc analyses revealed lack of independence between moral 
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judgment and politics in the binding domains.  However, not all the differences can be 
explained by politics (in the domains of Care and Fairness, for example, there was much 
more agreement in these samples).   
That the preference for learned virtue was strongest in the domains of Care and 
Fairness, both of which are pertinent to most people’s daily lives and are likely to 
provide moral challenges on a regular basis, further implies that adults too may be 
virtue theorists: we expect people to have a lot of practice being kind and fair.  It could 
also reflect the fact that the importance of moral concerns that matter to everyone, 
regardless of political orientation (Frimer et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009).  In light of 
Moral Foundations theory and the current results, an exploration of the association of 
politics and moral character judgment seems indicated.  That said, a more general 
attempt to understand how people judge moral character would be better made without 
limiting situations to domain-specific situations.  In real life, judgment is much more 
complicated, as people must process information not only in the immediate scenario, 
but also from their prior knowledge of participants in it and unconscious biases (e.g., 
Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012; Weiner, 1995).  In this research, the fact that the 
vignettes targeted specific domains with precise actions may have provided information 
about moral relevance that would otherwise be part of the overall interaction between 
judge (of moral character) and persons being judged.  If this is the case, then the fact 
that individual differences in the MFT binding domains of Respect for Authority, 
Loyalty, and Purity were, with Openness to Experience, the most reliable predictors of 
moral character judgment, may partly reflect research design. 
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Studies 2 and 3, which were intended to explore the association of individual 
differences in potentially related constructs and the effect of reading exposure, shed 
very little light on what contributes to character judgment.  The association of scores on 
the MFQ Authority, Loyalty, and Purity scales was interesting, but to some degree 
simply a validation of choice of stimuli and Moral Foundations Theory.  More 
informative was the relationships between Openness to Experience and moral character 
judgment.  The fact that greater openness was associated with the tendency to find the 
conflicted protagonists more moral in all domains may reflect a willingness to accept 
fallibility and the potential for learning and moral growth, particularly given that 
openness to experience has been associated with critical thinking (Facione et al., 1995) 
intellectual humility (Davis et al., 2015).  Intellectual humility has been defined as 
attentiveness to and mindfulness of one’s own weaknesses (Baehr, 2013); in the context 
of moral judgment, it implies the willingness to consider different options, even those 
that may at first glance appear immoral.  As such, people who find overcoming 
temptation more moral may be assuming that the primary difference between those that 
do so and those that purportedly simply automatically act morally is honesty and 
humility.  Intellectual humility was not measured in Study 2, but it may be part of what 
drives the effect of openness to experience. 
Openness to experience has also been associated with lifetime fiction exposure 
(Mar et al., 2009) as well as with creating complex fictional characters (Maslej, Oatley, 
& Mar, 2017).  As such, it is not surprising to find that people who found the conflicted 
character as more moral tended to recognize more author in most genres (the exception 
was for Romance authors, in the Care and Fairness domains, though this differed 
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between samples).  However, in general the associations between moral character 
judgment and familiarity with authors were not statistically significant, although trends 
for the most part were in alignment with expectations.  Such results may arise both from 
choice of stimuli, theoretical focus (Moral Foundations Theory, when moral domain 
does not, in fact, seem to matter as much as expected), or samples used (effects were 
stronger in the adult sample).  Given the importance of identification with characters to 
fictional engagement, that people may judge fictional characters in the same way they 
judge real people (Stueber, 2011), and that the law may treat fictional characters 
similarly to real people (see Kurtz, 2013; Schreyer, 2015), future research is merited to 
verify these results. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although these results provide a clear answer to the main question of whether 
the preference for moral striving (Starmans & Bloom, 2016) held across the five moral 
domains (Graham et al., 2009, 2012; Haidt, 2007)—no, they do not—many questions 
remain unanswered.  These studies offer little clear evidence regarding what is driving 
the overall tendency to find unconflicted people more moral, and why this preference is 
more pronounced in some domains.  Although the results suggest many avenues for 
future research, there are several limitations in the present studies that may have 
affected the results and as such limit the conclusions that can be drawn.  First I will 
address the standard limitations to collecting data that occurred in this study, followed 
by the more substantial issue of the vignettes used as stimuli.  Next, I will offer some 
suggestions for future research. 
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First, data collection suffered from certain limitations.  As is typical, both 
samples were majority female.  There were no differences in moral judgment across 
gender in any of the domains (ps > .200), and adding gender to the analyses of predictor 
variables with significant gender differences did not change the results (using logistic 
regression).  However, a more gender-balanced sample would increase the power to 
find any potential gender effects.  What is more, all data was collected online, thus 
limiting control of the survey-taking environment (but see Hardre, Crowson, & Xie, 
2010).  Undergraduates, who participated to meet course requirements, are especially 
likely to pay insufficient attention to the task at hand; here, only 68.6% of the college 
sample completed the entire study taking sufficient time and passing manipulation 
checks.  In addition, internal consistency reliability was low for the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire, particularly in the undergraduate sample; items were dropped from both 
the Care and Fairness scales to improve reliability.  Such low alphas are not untypical of 
the MFQ, but its use was deemed essential to the purposes of this study.  However, 
future research would benefit from more accurate measurement of the extent to which 
participants value the distinct foundations, perhaps through use of additional items or a 
different form of assessment (e.g., Frimer et al., 2013).  A final limitation of data 
collection pertains to Study 3, the purpose of which was to assess the association of 
book genres with moral judgment.  Neither sample targeted avid readers, and as such, 
mean author recognition was low across genres.  Because hypotheses included the 
prediction that the association of moral judgment and reading exposure would vary 
across domains, the lack of familiarity with authors limits the extent to which any 
claims can be made about the (primarily null in any case) results.  Future research 
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targeting reading audiences, and potentially including different forms of media (e.g., 
television; see Barnes & Black, 2015) might reveal different relationships. 
Second, and more importantly, the stimuli used to assess moral character 
judgment may have predisposed participants to prefer lack of moral conflict.  The 
vignettes were written to target each domain while at the same time avoiding potential 
confounds with the other four domains.  For example, a story written to target authority 
could not include family—parents are typical authority figures—because family is most 
pertinent to the loyalty domain, which is ultimately based on ingroup behavior (see 
Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007).  Two sets of four matching vignettes (conflicted vs. 
unconflicted protagonist; good vs. bad outcomes) were prepared for each domain, and 
participants were randomly assigned within each domain.  Two separate pilot studies 
were carried out to develop the final version (and even then, there were differences in 
responding within domains in the two current samples), with feedback given at each 
stage, but there are still slight differences between conflicted and unconflicted vignettes: 
the former are longer in general, for example.  The forced choice nature of the task, 
based on Starmans and Bloom (2016) may also have biased responding by inclining 
participants to judge this action as reflective of a lifetime of learning.   
Such reasoning could explain the strength of the preference for lack of conflict 
in the Care and Fairness domains: we all encounter moments where we are tempted to 
act unkindly or unfairly on a regular basis, starting in childhood (whereas the 
opportunity to change jobs or sports teams does not happen frequently if at all).  
Alternatively, it could be that the cost of acting morally in the Care and Fairness 
domains (not going to a party or teasing someone; not stealing small amounts of cash 
 86 
that no one would know about) was so small that participants did not see any real moral 
challenge in the situations.  Compared with the vignettes targeting the Loyalty domain, 
where remaining loyal demanded giving up greater long-term advantages (career 
advancement in sports or business), these sacrifices were small.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, participants were much more likely to find the conflicted protagonist 
more moral in the Loyalty vignettes. 
It may be that targeting the moral domains made it easier for participants to 
judge character by providing relevant information indirectly.  If, as Moral Foundations 
Theory proposes, people base their judgments on the extent to which a given act reflects 
the moral domains, restricting the vignettes to target a single domain might simplify 
decision-making: the violations are clear and do not conflict with other moral domains.  
This may be especially true if the politics that go hand in hand with MFT influence 
character judgment, as is suggested by the association between political orientation and 
moral character judgment found in Study 1.  This represents an important potential 
confound inherent in using vignettes that target moral domains that are known to reflect 
political bent; more politically neutral stimuli may provide more information about the 
contributing effects of moral constructs unrelated to politics (e.g., moral agency) as well 
as fiction and nonfiction exposure.  Although Frimer et al. (2013) found more 
similarities than differences in judgment, politics did affect their results, and MFT was 
in many ways designed precisely to identify political orientation.  The purpose of this 
research was not to investigate the extent to which politics may affect moral character, 
but the results clearly suggest that it may be a fascinating direction for future research. 
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To approximate real life in research, it may be necessary to use more complex 
scenarios that include threats to more than one domain.  Vignettes that describe the life 
trajectory of a person (e.g., proposed as a moral exemplar) may give a better picture of 
preferences for striving, as well as clarifying the nature of the current results: are 
participants assuming virtue that has developed over years of striving, or are they 
imagining someone who was born virtuous (as the children in the Starmans and Bloom 
studies may have done)?  Moral judgment based on a more complete picture might also 
relate to individual differences in the variables tested here, such as integrity, need for 
cognition, and moral agency. 
Future directions.  The most intriguing result of this research was the failure to 
replicate Starmans and Bloom (2016).  Starmans has claimed to have replicated their 
results using vignettes that feature adult protagonists (private communication); as such, 
an important question is why, in Study 1, results revealed an overwhelming tendency to 
find lack of temptation more moral.  Besides developing vignettes that target different 
aspects of morally relevant behavior, there are several avenues for future research that 
could address this question.  To start with, the effect of presenting longer, more 
complete pictures of protagonists’ lives needs to be tested.  For example, participants 
could be asked to nominate one of two moral exemplars for a prize based on life-
narratives that revealed either the long-term (and successful) effort to overcome 
temptation or an inborn goodness tracing back to childhood. 
Further research is also needed to replicate the results reported here in studies 
that target specific effects.  Many tests were run, increasing the risk of Type 1 error 
even when effects seem strong.  For example, all analyses regarding political orientation 
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were exploratory, and need to be repeated, ideally with pre-registered studies, to 
confirm the results.  Rather than using one large sample, future studies should test 
limited numbers of hypothesis in well-defined, simple designs based on the results 
reported here. 
Study 3 tested the effects of reading exposure, but conclusions are limited by 
data collection that did not target readers; a better estimate of the effects of genre 
exposure would be obtained with samples of frequent readers.  It would also be 
interesting to test the relationship of television exposure and moral character judgment, 
given that people spend more time watching television than they do reading.  Another 
possibility is adding a redemption condition—a story in which the protagonist makes up 
for past wrongdoing by an extreme example of moral goodness.  The extent to which 
people value redemption stories might be related to exposure to fiction, especially given 
the tendency of those who recognized more authors to appreciate moral striving in 
Study 3. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the results of this investigation suggest that moral character 
judgment—and particularly, the view of temptation therein—varies across domains.  
Nonetheless, across domains, there was still a clear preference for lack of moral 
conflict, in direct contrast to past research (Starmans & Bloom, 2016).  Openness to 
experience was the most reliable predictor of moral character judgment, once other 
personality factors were controlled.  Scores on the MFQ scales of Respect for 
Authority, Loyalty, and Purity were most likely to relate to moral character judgment, 
whereas other aspects of morality, such as integrity and moral agency, had little effect.  
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Imaginative resistance, on the other hand, was associated with preferences for the 
unconflicted character in general, perhaps reflecting a fear of moral contagion (Black & 
Barnes, 2017).  Similarly, although the pattern of Study 3 results suggests that the more 
books people read, the more likely they are to find moral striving more admirable, 
further investigation would be necessary to confirm this tendency.  Finally, it may be 
that politics plays a large part in moral character judgment, particularly when it comes 
to moral behavior pertaining to specific MFT domains.  Though the nature of this 
research and study design limit the inferences one can make, the results suggest various 
avenues for future research.  Different types of moral violations, set in scenarios that do 
not target the moral foundations, potentially using longer, more complex vignettes, have 
the potential to shed light on how people judge moral character. 
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Appendix A: Vignettes 
Sample 
Unconflicted helping: 
Dave’s sister lost her favorite ball. She has been looking really hard, but she 
still hasn’t found it. So she asked Dave to help her look for it. Helping people is the 
right thing to do. And Dave wants to help his brother look for her ball. Dave’s friends 
are playing right outside. But Dave doesn’t want to go play with his friends 
right now.  Dave doesn’t like playing outside.  Dave wants to help his sister find 
her ball. So Dave helped his sister look for the ball. It was really easy for Dave to help 
his sister because he didn’t want to play with his friends at all.  So Dave helped his 
sister. 
Conflicted helping: 
Matt’s sister lost her favorite teddy bear. She has been looking really hard, but 
she still hasn’t found it. So she asked Matt to help her look for it. Helping people is the 
right thing to do. And Matt wants to help his sister look for her bear. But Matt’s friends 
are playing right outside. Even though he wants to help, Matt also really wants to go 
play with his friends right now, and not help his sister find her teddy bear. Part of Matt 
wants to help his sister, but part of him wants to go outside and play. So Matt helped his 
sister look for the teddy bear. It was really hard for Matt to help his sister because he 
wanted to play outside with his friends. But Matt helped his sister anyway. 
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Care/Harm 
Care Vignette A: Emotional Support 
Unconflicted Care: 
Pat was about to leave the house to go to a party when the phone rang. It was 
Pat’s cousin, Brett.  Normally, Pat would ignore the phone and go to the party, but Brett 
had recently been diagnosed with cancer and was going through a rough time, and Pat 
knew Brett relied on Pat’s emotional support.  Pat had really been looking forward to 
the party, but as soon as Brett called, the party didn’t seem nearly as much fun.  Talking 
to Brett would be the right thing to do, and Pat had no hesitation in picking up the 
phone.  There would be other parties.  Pat picked up the phone and spent the next hour 
listening to Brett and offering support. 
Conflicted Care: 
Sam was about to leave the house to go to a party when the phone rang. It was 
Sam’s cousin, Alex.  Normally, Sam would ignore the phone and go to the party, but 
Alex had recently been diagnosed with cancer and was going through a rough time, and 
Sam knew Alex relied on Sam’s emotional support.  Sam had really been looking 
forward to the party, and when Alex called, Sam didn’t want to pick up the phone. Sam 
thought about how much fun the party would be.  Talking to Alex would be the right 
thing to do, but Sam really didn’t want to miss the party.  Sam was really tempted to 
forget Alex and go to the party, but in the end picked up the phone and spent the next 
hour listening to Alex and offering support. 
 111 
Unconflicted Harm: 
Pat was about to leave the house to go to a party when the phone rang. It was 
Pat’s cousin, Brett.  Brett had recently been diagnosed with cancer and was going 
through a rough time, and Pat knew Brett relied on Pat’s emotional support.  Pat knew 
that the right thing to do was pick up the phone, but the party was going to be a lot of 
fun.  Talking to Brett might be the right thing to do, but Pat didn’t want to miss out on 
the fun at the party.  Pat ignored the phone and hurried out to go to the party. 
Conflicted Harm: 
Sam was about to leave the house to go to a party when the phone rang. It was 
Sam’s cousin, Alex.  Alex had recently been diagnosed with cancer and was going 
through a rough time, and Sam knew Alex relied on Sam’s emotional support.  Sam had 
really been looking forward to the party, and when Alex called, Sam didn’t want to pick 
up the phone. Sam thought about how much fun the party would be, and how Alex 
would want to talk for hours.  Talking to Alex would be the right thing to do, but Sam 
didn’t want to miss the party.  Sam felt bad about it, but after an internal debate, ignored 
the phone and hurried out to go to the party. 
Care Vignette B: Not teasing 
Unconflicted Care: 
Every Monday, Skyler went to lunch with fellow students.  Sometimes Frankie 
came with the group. No one really liked Frankie, because Frankie talked all the time 
and had no sense of humor; it was really easy to poke fun at Frankie, who then felt hurt 
and would leave the group. Today was no different; Frankie talked too much, and 
Skyler saw many opportunities to tease Frankie.  No one even wanted Frankie to be 
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there. However, Skyler knew it would be wrong to make Frankie feel bad just so the 
rest of them could get a good laugh. Skyler wasn't tempted to make fun of Frankie, and 
was quick to distract anyone else who looked like they might be going to say something 
cruel. 
Conflicted Care: 
Every Monday, Dale went to lunch with fellow students.  Sometimes Lou came 
with the group. No one really liked Lou, because Lou talked all the time and had no 
sense of humor; it was really easy to poke fun at Lou, who then felt hurt and would 
leave the group. Today was no different; Lou talked too much, and Dale saw many 
opportunities to tease Lou.  No one even wanted Lou to be there, and Dale was getting 
really sick of being talked over. It was really tempting to join with everyone in teasing 
Lou , even though Dale knew it would be wrong. Despite the strong temptation, Dale 
didn’t make fun of Lou, and was quick to distract others who might be going to say 
something cruel. 
Unconflicted Harm: 
Every Monday, Skyler went to lunch with fellow students.  Sometimes Frankie 
came with the group. No one really liked Frankie, because Frankie talked all the time 
and had no sense of humor; it was really easy to poke fun at Frankie, who then felt hurt 
and would leave the group.  Today was no different; Frankie talked too much, and 
Skyler was getting really sick of being talked over. Skyler made fun of Frankie 
mercilessly, laughing loudly whenever anyone else said something cruel. 
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Conflicted Harm: 
Every Monday, Dale went to lunch with fellow students.  Sometimes Lou came 
with the group. No one really liked Lou, because Lou talked all the time and had no 
sense of humor; it was really easy to poke fun at Lou, who then felt hurt and would 
leave the group.  Today was no different; Lou talked too much, and Dale was getting 
really sick of being talked over.  It was really tempting to join with everyone in teasing 
Lou, even though Dale knew it would be wrong to make Lou feel bad. Dale was 
conflicted and tried to resist the temptation to join in on the teasing, but ultimately made 
fun of Lou anyway, laughing guiltily whenever anyone else said something cruel. 
Fairness/cheating 
Fairness Vignette A: Debate team 
Unconflicted Fairness: 
Rowan’s debate team was going to Washington, D. C. for a national contest, and 
they had been fundraising all semester. Rowan was the treasurer and had to manage the 
account and divide up the money between the 7 team members. After calculating their 
net profit and splitting it amongst them, Rowan reported in a group email that they each 
had $247.20, and put seven checks in the mail. Later, Rowan discovered $23 in cash 
that hadn’t been added to the total. It would be easiest just to keep the money, but 
Rowan knew that would be wrong.  Without hesitation, Rowan went to the bank for the 
change required to pay each person $3.28. 
Conflicted Fairness: 
Elliott’s debate team was going to Washington, D. C. for a national contest, and 
they had been fundraising all semester. Elliott was the treasurer and had to manage the 
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account and divide up the money between the 7 team members. After calculating their 
net profit and splitting it amongst them, Elliott reported in a group email that they each 
had $247.20, and put seven checks in the mail. Later, Elliott discovered $23 in cash that 
hadn’t been added to the total Even though Elliott knew it would be wrong, it was very 
tempting to just pocket the money. Elliott came very close to doing just that, but after an 
internal struggle, went to the bank for the change required to pay each person $3.28. 
Unconflicted cheating: 
Rowan’s debate team was going to Washington, D. C. for a national contest, and 
they had been fundraising all semester. Rowan was the treasurer and had to manage the 
account and divide up the money between the 7 team members. After calculating their 
net profit and splitting it amongst them, Rowan reported in a group email that they each 
had $247.20, and put seven checks in the mail. Later, Rowan discovered $23 in cash 
that hadn’t been added to the total. It would be easiest just to keep the money, and 
Rowan already had some ideas about how to spend it. Rather than going to the bank for 
the change required to pay each person $3.28, Rowan kept the cash.  
Conflicted cheating: 
Elliott’s debate team was going to Washington, D. C. for a national contest, and 
they had been fundraising all semester. Elliott was the treasurer and had to manage the 
account and divide up the money between the 7 team members. After calculating their 
net profit and splitting it amongst them, Elliott reported in a group email that they each 
had $247.20, and put seven checks in the mail. Later, Elliott discovered $23 in cash that 
hadn’t been added to the total. Even though Elliott knew it would be wrong, it was very 
tempting to just pocket the money. Elliott debated being more transparent, but rather 
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than going to the bank for the change required to pay each person $3.28, Elliott kept the 
cash, feeling slightly guilty. 
Fairness Vignette B: Lemonade 
Unconflicted Fairness: 
Dakota and four friends were the teenage winners in their town’s Lemonade Day 
contest. They had planned to donate 50% of their net profit to charity, and split the rest 
between themselves.  They made a total of $219.10. Dakota, who had volunteered to 
sort out the money, set aside half to donate to their local pet rescue. Splitting the 
remaining $109.55 between the five friends would mean giving $21.91 to each. It would 
be easier to give everyone $20. Dakota’s siblings suggested that doing the accounting 
was worth $9.55, but, even after spending more than an hour adding up the expenses 
and counting money, Dakota knew that wouldn’t be fair and without hesitation decided 
to add $9.55 to the pet rescue envelope. 
Conflicted Fairness: 
Addison and four friends were the teenage winners in their town’s Lemonade 
Day contest. They had planned to donate 50% of their net profit to charity, and split the 
rest between themselves. They made a total of $219.10. Addison, who had volunteered 
to sort out the money, set aside half to donate to their local pet rescue. Splitting the 
remaining $109.55 between the five friends would mean giving $21.91 to each. It would 
be easier to give everyone $20. Addison’s siblings suggested that doing the accounting 
was worth $9.55, and, after spending more than an hour adding up the expenses and 
counting money, Addison was really tempted to keep the money without telling the 
 116 
others. However, after an inner struggle, Addison decided that wouldn’t be fair and 
added $9.55 to the pet rescue envelope. 
Unconflicted cheating: 
Dakota and four friends were the teenage winners in their town’s Lemonade Day 
contest. They had planned to donate 50% of their net profit to charity, and split the rest 
between themselves.  They made a total of $219.10. Dakota, who had reluctantly 
volunteered to sort out the money, set aside half to donate to their local pet rescue. 
Splitting the remaining $109.55 between the five friends would mean giving $21.91 to 
each. It would be easier to give everyone $20. Dakota’s siblings suggested that doing 
the accounting was worth $9.55, and after spending more than an hour adding up the 
expenses and counting money, Dakota decided to keep the money without telling the 
others.  Dakota kept the $9.55 and divided the rest into $20 each. 
Conflicted cheating: 
Addison and four friends were the teenage winners in their town’s Lemonade 
Day contest. They had planned to donate 50% of their net profit to charity, and split the 
rest between themselves.  They made a total of $219.10. Addison, who had reluctantly 
volunteered to sort out the money, set aside half to donate to their local pet rescue. 
Splitting the remaining $109.55 between the five friends would mean giving $21.91 to 
each. It would be easier to give everyone $20. Addison’s siblings suggested that doing 
the accounting was worth $9.55, and, after spending more than an hour adding up the 
expenses and counting money, Addison was really tempted to keep the money without 
telling the others. Addison debated the options and guiltily decided it was justified to 
keep the $9.55 and divide the rest into $20 each. 
 117 
Loyalty/betrayal 
Loyalty Vignette A: Family Business 
Conflicted Loyalty: 
Devin had worked for the family company since graduating from college, 
performing the job of chief marketing officer, although there was no official title. Over 
the years, Devin had built up a network that had helped to revitalize the family business 
and become essential to its functioning. Devin’s skill had not gone unnoticed, and a 
major international corporation made an offer that was more than triple Devin’s current 
salary. Devin was very tempted to take it: the new job offered more opportunities of 
promotion as well as better remuneration. However, family was more important than 
money, and Devin felt it would be a betrayal to leave. Devin went back and forth, 
weighing the costs and benefits of taking the new job, before reluctantly deciding to 
remain with the family company. 
Unconflicted Loyalty 
Bailey had worked for the family company since graduating from college, 
performing the job of chief marketing officer, although there was no official title. Over 
the years, Bailey had built up a network that had helped to revitalize the family business 
and become essential to its functioning. Bailey’s skill had not gone unnoticed, and a 
major international corporation made an offer that was more than triple Bailey’s current 
salary. However, although the new job offered more opportunities of promotion as well 
as better remuneration, Bailey was not tempted. Family was more important than 
money, and Bailey felt it would be a betrayal to leave. Bailey had no hesitation in 
turning down the job opportunity in order to remain with the family company. 
 118 
Conflicted Betrayal: 
Devin had worked for the family company since graduating from college, 
performing the job of chief marketing officer, although there was no official title. Over 
the years, Devin had built up a network that had helped to revitalize the family business 
and become essential to its functioning. Devin’s skill had not gone unnoticed, and a 
major international corporation made an offer that was more than triple Devin’s current 
salary. However, family was more important than money, and Devin felt it would be a 
betrayal to leave. Devin seriously considered remaining with the family company, but 
after weighing the costs and benefits of taking the new job, Devin reluctantly decided to 
accept the job offer. 
Unconflicted Betrayal: 
Bailey had worked for the family company since graduating from college, performing 
the job of chief marketing officer, although there was no official title. Over the years, 
Bailey had built up a network that had helped to revitalize the family business and 
become essential to its functioning. Bailey’s skill had not gone unnoticed, and a major 
international corporation made an offer that was more than triple Bailey’s current 
salary. The new job offered more opportunities of promotion as well as better 
remuneration, and Bailey knew it was an excellent career move. Family might be more 
important than money in some ways, but Bailey had no hesitation about accepting this 
wonderful job offer. 
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Loyalty Vignette B: Sports team 
Conflicted Loyalty: 
Taylor was a sophomore at University of Sigma and a key part of one of their 
school’s most competitive teams when a rival school offered Taylor a scholarship as 
incentive to switch schools—and teams.  The scholarship was good—since both 
Taylor’s school and the rival were expensive private institutions—but what really 
tempted Taylor was the opportunity to play with a star team under an excellent coach. 
Taylor knew there would be a lot of opportunity to learn and improve.  However, the 
University of Sigma team depended on Taylor, who had formed firm friendships and 
felt great respect for their own coach.  After much deliberation, Taylor reluctantly 
decided to stay at Sigma. 
Unconflicted Loyalty 
Corey was a sophomore at University of Sigma and a key part of one of their 
school’s most competitive teams when a rival school offered Corey a scholarship as 
incentive to switch schools—and teams.  The scholarship was good—since both 
Corey’s school and the rival were expensive private institutions—but Corey wasn’t 
tempted by the money or the opportunity to play with a star team under an excellent 
coach, because the University of Sigma team depended on Corey.  Corey had formed 
firm friendships and felt great respect for their own coach.  Corey never even 
considered leaving Sigma. 
Conflicted Betrayal: 
Taylor was a sophomore at University of Sigma and a key part of one of their 
school’s most competitive teams when a rival school offered Taylor a scholarship as 
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incentive to switch schools—and teams.  The scholarship was good—since both 
Taylor’s school and the rival were expensive private institutions—but Taylor felt 
conflicted about transferring.  The University of Sigma team depended on Taylor, who 
had formed firm friendships and felt great respect for their own coach.  However, 
Taylor was really tempted by the scholarship and the opportunity to play with a star 
team under an excellent coach. It was a tough decision, but in the end, Taylor decided to 
transfer to the rival school. 
Unconflicted Betrayal: 
Corey was a sophomore at University of Sigma and a key part of one of their 
school’s most competitive teams when a rival school offered Corey a scholarship as 
incentive to switch schools—and teams.  The scholarship was good—since both 
Corey’s school and the rival were expensive private institutions—and Corey was 
delighted to receive the offer.  The University of Sigma team depended on Corey, who 
had formed firm friendships and felt great respect for their own coach, but Corey was 
really excited by the scholarship and the opportunity to play with a star team under an 
excellent coach. It was an easy decision when Corey decided to transfer to the rival 
school. 
Authority/subversion 
Authority Vignette A: Red Light 
Unconflicted Authority: 
Jean was driving home at three o’clock in the morning and came to a stoplight at 
the top of a hill.  Jean had to turn left, and the left arrow stayed red through an entire 
cycle of the lights.  Jean could see for a mile in every direction: there was no one 
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around.  Jean was tired of waiting, but did not want to run the red light.  Even though no 
one would know about it, and it wouldn’t put anyone in danger, Jean wasn’t at all 
tempted to just turn left. Traffic laws existed for a reason.  Jean decided to wait for a 
green light. 
Conflicted Authority: 
Kelly was driving home at three o’clock in the morning and came to a stoplight 
at the top of a hill.  Kelly had to turn left, and the left arrow stayed red through an entire 
cycle of the lights.  Kelly could see for a mile in every direction: there was no one 
around.  Kelly was tired of waiting and thought about running the light. No one would 
know about it, and it wouldn’t put anyone in danger. Kelly was really tempted to keep 
going.  Nonetheless, Kelly knew that traffic laws were there for a reason, and after 
debating just turning left, Kelly decided to wait for a green light. 
Unconflicted Subversion: 
Jean was driving home at three o’clock in the morning and came to a stoplight at 
the top of a hill.  Jean had to turn left, and the left arrow stayed red through an entire 
cycle of the lights.  Jean could see for a mile in every direction: there was no one 
around.  Jean was tired of waiting, and decided to run the red light.  No one would 
know about it, and it wouldn’t put anyone in danger.  Jean drove through the 
intersection and went home. 
Conflicted Subversion: 
Kelly was driving home at three o’clock in the morning and came to a stoplight 
at the top of a hill.  Kelly had to turn left, and the left arrow stayed red through an entire 
cycle of the lights.  Kelly could see for a mile in every direction: there was no one 
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around.  Kelly was tired of waiting, and thought about running the red light.  No one 
would know about it, and it wouldn’t put anyone in danger, but Kelly was conflicted. 
Traffic laws existed for a reason.  But after an internal debate, Kelly drove through the 
intersection and went home. 
Authority Vignette B: Cutting in Line 
Unconflicted Authority: 
Casey was renewing a license during lunchbreak.  There was a long line, and 
Casey worried about getting back to work late.  Other people were getting impatient; 
there was a break between two desks where a person could slip through and skip two 
loops of the line. A police officer had asked them to please respect the line, but Casey 
watched several more people slip through. Casey had no desire to skip the line. Waiting 
was the right thing to do, so Casey waited, even though that meant being late for a 
meeting at work. 
Conflicted Authority: 
Chris was renewing a license during lunchbreak.  There was a long line, and 
Chris worried about getting back to work late.  Other people were getting impatient; 
there was a break between two desks where a person could slip through and skip two 
loops of the line. A police officer had asked them to please respect the line, but Chris 
watched several people slip through. Chris was very tempted to do the same, but after 
an internal debate, Chris waited in line, even though that meant being late for a meeting 
at work. 
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Unconflicted Subversion: 
Casey was renewing a license during lunchbreak.  There was a long line, and 
Casey worried about getting back to work late.  Other people were getting impatient; 
there was a break between two desks where a person could slip through and skip two 
loops of the line. A police officer had asked them to please respect the line, but Casey 
watched several more people slip through, and thought it would be silly to wait. As 
soon as the police officer left the room, Casey happily skipped the long loops and 
moved near the head of the line. 
Conflicted Subversion: 
Chris was renewing a license during lunchbreak.  There was a long line, and 
Chris worried about getting back to work late.  Other people were getting impatient; 
there was a break between two desks where a person could slip through and skip two 
loops of the line. A police officer had asked them to please respect the line, but Chris 
watched several people slip through. Chris knew that that cutting in front of people was 
unfair. Waiting would be the right thing to do, and Chris tried to resist the temptation to 
cut in front of other people. After a while, though, Chris decided to slip through the 
desks and skip most of the line. Chris felt bad, but didn’t want to wait any longer. 
Purity/degradation 
Vignette A: Incest 
Unconflicted Purity 
Jules met Tristan their freshman year in college, and they were immediately 
attracted to each other. They shared the same taste in food, film, and sports, and they 
had three classes together.  Over the course of the semester, they spent more and more 
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time together, and Jules went home with Tristan for Thanksgiving.  Tristan’s parents 
had been happy to have a guest, but they seemed shocked when they saw Jules and 
heard Jules’s full name.  After a brief private conversation, Tristan’s parents revealed 
that Jules and Tristan were really half-siblings.  Their budding sexual attraction was 
now taboo, but Tristan didn't care about taboos. Tristan wanted to continue the 
relationship.  However, Jules was not at all tempted to continue the relationship and 
made it clear to Tristan that they could only be friends. 
Conflicted Purity: 
Jamie met Riley their freshman year in college and were immediately attracted 
to each other. They shared the same taste in food, film, and sports, and they had three 
classes together.  Over the course of the semester, they spent more and more time 
together, and Jamie went home with Riley for Thanksgiving.  Riley’s parents had been 
happy to have a guest, but they seemed shocked when they saw Jamie and heard 
Jamie’s full name.  After a brief private conversation, Riley’s parents revealed that 
Jamie and Riley were really half-siblings.  Their budding sexual attraction was now 
taboo. Despite knowing they were siblings, Jamie still felt an intense sexual attraction to 
Riley, who thought taboos were foolish and wanted to continue the relationship. Jamie 
also felt very tempted, but after a great deal of internal debate, decided to tell Riley 
that they could only be friends. 
Conflicted Degradation: 
Jules met Tristan their freshman year in college and were immediately attracted 
to each other. They shared the same taste in food, film, and sports, and they had three 
classes together.  Over the course of the semester, they spent more and more time 
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together, and Jules went home with Tristan for Thanksgiving.  Tristan’s parents had 
been happy to have a guest, but they seemed shocked when they saw Jules and heard 
Jules’ full name.  After a brief private conversation, Tristan’s parents revealed that Jules 
and Tristan were really half-siblings.  Their budding sexual attraction was now taboo, 
but Tristan didn't care about taboos. Tristan wanted to continue the relationship, and 
despite knowing they were siblings, Jules was also tempted.  After a great deal of 
debate, Jules decided to pursue the relationship, despite a lingering feeling of 
guilt... 
Unconflicted Degradation 
Jamie met Riley their freshman year in college and they were immediately 
attracted to each other. They shared the same taste in food, film, and sports, and they 
had three classes together.  Over the course of the semester, they spent more and more 
time together, and Jamie went home with Riley for Thanksgiving.  Riley’s parents had 
been happy to have a guest, but they seemed shocked when they saw Jamie and heard 
Jamie’s full name.  After a brief private conversation, Riley’s parents revealed that 
Jamie and Riley were really half-siblings. Their budding sexual attraction was now 
taboo. Despite knowing they were siblings, Jamie did not care if it was taboo and 
easily decided to continue the relationship, with Riley's enthusiastic approval. 
Vignette B: Cannibalism 
Unconflicted Purity: 
River and Micah were backpacking in the Sierra Nevada when an early 
snowstorm forced them to hide in a cave for three days. By the time the storm abated, 
they had run out of food, and they started back. The mountain was unrecognizable in 
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the snow, and they went down the wrong ridge. Micah slipped and fell several hundred 
feet down into a canyon, dying instantly. River reached Micah’s body, but because of 
the snow, had no choice but to stay put and hope for rescue. Over the next several days, 
hunger pangs drove River to desperation. No matter how hungry River got, River 
would not and could not consider eating Micah’s body. River nearly starved, but 
eventually was rescued. 
Conflicted Purity: 
Logan and Bobbie were backpacking in the Sierra Nevada when an early 
snowstorm forced them to hide in a cave for three days. By the time the storm abated, 
they had run out of food, and they started back. The mountain was unrecognizable in 
the snow, and they went down the wrong ridge. Bobbie slipped and fell several hundred 
feet down into a canyon, dying instantly. Logan reached Bobbie’s body, but because of 
the snow, had no choice but to stay put and hope for rescue. Over the next several days, 
hunger pangs drove Logan to desperation. The hungrier Logan got, the more tempting it 
became to eat the only real source of food available: Bobbie’s body. Logan agonized 
and nearly gave into temptation, but ultimately resisted and was eventually rescued. 
Conflicted degradation: 
Logan and Bobbie were backpacking in the Sierra Nevada when an early 
snowstorm forced them to hide in a cave for three days. By the time the storm abated, 
they had run out of food, and they started back. The mountain was unrecognizable in 
the snow, and they went down the wrong ridge. Bobbie slipped and fell several hundred 
feet down into a canyon, dying instantly. Logan reached Bobbie’s body, but because of 
the snow, had no choice but to stay put and hope for rescue. Over the next several days, 
 127 
hunger pangs drove Logan to desperation. The hungrier Logan got, the more tempting it 
became to eat the only real source of food available: Bobbie’s body. Logan agonized, 
but ultimately gave into the temptation and decided to eat Bobbie’s remains. Eventually, 
Logan was rescued. 
Unconflicted degradation: 
River and Micah were backpacking in the Sierra Nevada when an early 
snowstorm forced them to hide in a cave for three days. By the time the storm abated, 
they had run out of food, and they started back. The mountain was unrecognizable in 
the snow, and they went down the wrong ridge. Micah slipped and fell several hundred 
feet down into a canyon, dying instantly. River reached Micah’s body, but because of 
the snow, had no choice but to stay put and hope for rescue. Over the next several days, 
hunger pangs drove River to desperation. Soon, River decided that the logical course of 
action was to eat the only real source of food available: Micah’s body. Once the idea 
occurred to River, it was an easy decision. River decided to eat Micah’s remains. 
Eventually, River was rescued. 
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Appendix B: Instrumentation 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) 
Part 1. When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the 
following considerations relevant to your thinking? (not at all relevant, not very 
relevant, slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant, extremely relevant): 
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally  
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others 
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country 
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority  
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency 
Whether or not someone was good at math (filler) 
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable 
Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group 
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society  
Whether or not someone did something disgusting 
Whether or not someone was cruel 
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of  
Part 2. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or 
disagreement: (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, strongly agree): 
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue. 
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that 
everyone is treated fairly. 
I am proud of my country’s history. 
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.  
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It is better to do good than to do bad. (filler) 
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. (discarded) 
Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something 
wrong.   
Men and women each have different roles to play in society. 
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. 
It can never be right to kill a human being. (discarded) 
I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children 
inherit nothing. (discarded) 
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. 
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey 
anyway because that is my duty. 
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
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Big Five Inventory  
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008): 
How I am in general 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with that statement. 
(Strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
I am someone who… 
Is talkative 
Tends to find fault with others 
Does a thorough job 
Is depressed, blue 
Is original, comes up with new ideas 
Is reserved 
Is helpful and unselfish with others 
Can be somewhat careless 
Is relaxed, handles stress well.   
Is curious about many different 
things 
Is full of energy 
Starts quarrels with others 
Is a reliable worker 
Can be tense 
Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
Generates a lot of enthusiasm 
Has a forgiving nature 
Tends to be disorganized 
Worries a lot 
Has an active imagination 
Tends to be quiet 
Is generally trusting 
Tends to be lazy 
Is emotionally stable, not easily 
upset 
Is inventive 
Has an assertive personality 
Can be cold and aloof 
Perseveres until the task is finished 
Can be moody 
Values artistic, aesthetic 
experiences 
Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
Does things efficiently 
Remains calm in tense situations 
Prefers work that is routine 
Is outgoing, sociable 
Is sometimes rude to others 
Makes plans and follows through 
with them 
Gets nervous easily 
Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
Has few artistic interests 
Likes to cooperate with others 
Is easily distracted 
Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature 
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Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016) 
Listed below are some statements about how people feel and behave. Please indicate 
your agreement with each statement AS YOU REALLY BELIEVE IT APPLIES TO 
YOU. DO NOT be influenced by what other people might believe or if it seems you 
should feel or act differently than you do. PLEASE ANSWER HONESTLY. (6 points, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
Moral self: 
1. I try hard to act honestly in most things I do. 
2. Not hurting other people is one of the rules I live by. 
3. It is important for me to treat other people fairly. 
4. I want other people to know they can rely on me. 
5. I always act in ways that do the most good and least harm to other people. 
6. If doing something will hurt another person, I try to avoid it even if no one would 
know. 
7. One of the most important things in life is to do what you know is right. 
8. Once I’ve made up my mind about what is the right thing to do, I make sure I do 
it. 
 
Integrity: 
9. As long as I make a decision to do something that helps me, it does not matter 
much if other people are harmed. 
10. It is ok to do something you know is wrong if the rewards for doing it are great. 
11. If no one is watching or will know it does not matter if I do the right thing. 
12. It is more important that people think you are honest than being honest. 
13. If no one could find out, it is okay to steal a small amount of money or other 
things that no one will miss. 
14. There is no point in going out of my way to do something good if no one is 
around to appreciate it. 
15. If a cashier accidentally gives me $10 extra change, I usually act as if I did not 
notice it. 
16. Lying and cheating are just things you have to do in this world. 
17. Doing things that some people might view as not honest does not bother me. 
18. If people treat me badly, I will treat them in the same manner. 
19. I will go along with a group decision, even if I know it is morally wrong. 
20. Having moral values is worthless in today’s society. 
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Moral Agency Scale (Black, 2016): 
Listed below are some statements about how people feel and behave. Please indicate 
your agreement with each statement AS YOU REALLY BELIEVE IT APPLIES TO 
YOU. DO NOT be influenced by what other people might believe or if it seems you 
should feel or act differently than you do. PLEASE ANSWER HONESTLY. (5 points, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
 
1. I have a choice whether to treat people well or badly. 
2. If I feel pressured into doing something, I’m not as responsible as when I decide 
on my own. 
3. If I get into trouble, it is my own fault even if someone else told me to do it. 
4. I make up my own mind about doing good or bad things. 
5. Sometimes it seems like fate determines whether my actions are good or bad. 
6. I am just as at fault for breaking the rules when no one knows as when everyone 
knows. 
7. Doing wrong is not really the fault of individuals when society enables them. 
8. I am the one responsible for my own behavior, good and bad. 
9. No one can make me do something I know to be wrong. 
10. I feel responsible for the consequences of my actions. 
11. Luck, more than what you do, is responsible for whether things turn out for the 
best. 
12. Most of the time I can tell how my actions are going to affect others.  
13. My actions in most situations are based on what other people tell me is the right 
thing to do. 
14. In most cases, I can make my own decisions about what is right or wrong in a 
situation. 
15. When making decisions that affect other people, I am usually aware of various 
options. 
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Machiavellian Personality Scale (Dahling et al., 2009): 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
Remember, there are no wrong or right answers, just answer honestly. 
 
(5 points, strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
 
1. I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others. 
2. The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my 
benefit. 
3. I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed. 
4. I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own 
goals. 
5. I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught. 
6. People are only motivated by personal gain. 
7. I dislike committing to groups because I don’t trust others. 
8. Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead. 
9. If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it. 
10. Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the situation at my 
expense. 
 
Imaginative resistance Scale (Black & Barnes, 2017): 
Instructions: We are interested in your experiences with reading and 
watching fiction. When answering the following questions, please think about 
books, movies, or TV shows that you are familiar with.  Please select the option that 
best shows your agreement or disagreement with each statement.  Thank you. (Likert 
scale) 
 
1. A good author can make me believe anything from dragons to space travel. 
(filler) 
2. The hero of a story should be a moral person. 
3. It makes me uncomfortable when my favorite character commits moral 
violations as if they were no big deal. 
4. Reading books where bad things are depicted as morally acceptable makes me 
feel dirty. 
5. I just can’t go along with a story when it violates my beliefs about morality. 
6. At times it feels like the author of a book is asking me to endorse actions that I 
know are wrong. 
 134 
7. I sometimes cannot go along with a story when the “good” characters do 
morally reprehensible things. 
8. Some things just shouldn't be done, even within a book. 
9. I would be uncomfortable reading a book in which the protagonist thought it 
was okay to kill people. 
10. I really don’t buy into stories that are full of werewolves and witches (filler) 
11. Sympathizing with immoral characters makes me feel immoral myself. 
12. I don’t like books where bad things are presented as the right thing to do. 
13. I usually avoid books that have the good guys acting in ways that are morally 
unacceptable. 
14. Being asked to imagine morally repugnant things makes me uncomfortable. 
15. I would be uncomfortable reading a story in which the author endorsed torture. 
16. I just can’t go along with a story when it violates the rules of physics. (filler) 
 
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance (McLain, 1993; 2009): 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
Remember, there are no wrong or right answers, just answer honestly. 
 (7 points, strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well. 
2. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several 
different perspectives. 
3. I try to avoid situations that are ambiguous. 
4. I prefer familiar situations to new ones. 
5. Problems that cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little 
threatening. 
6. I avoid situations that are too complicated for me to easily understand. 
7. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations. 
8. I enjoy tackling problems that are complex enough to be ambiguous. 
9. I try to avoid problems that don’t seem to have only one “best” solution. 
10. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity. 
11. I dislike ambiguous situations. 
12. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain. 
13. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity. 
 
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1980): 
1. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. (R) 
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4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities. (R) 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have 
to think in depth about something. (R) 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. (R) 
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. (R) 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. (R) 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. (R) 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of 
mental effort. (R) 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works.(R) 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally. 
 
Genre Familiarity Test (Black, Capps, & Barnes, 2017): 
Below is a list of names. Some of them are authors of books, and some of them are not. 
Please put a check mark next to the ones that you know for sure are authors. Thank 
you. 
Classics Contemporary Literary 
Charlotte Bronte Michael Chabon 
Charles Dickens Paulo Coelho 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky Umberto Eco 
George Elliot Gabriel Garcia Marquez 
William Faulkner Michel Houellebecq 
F. Scott Fitzgerald Jhumpa Lahiri 
Thomas Hardy Cormac McCarthy 
Nathaniel Hawthorne David Mitchell 
Ernest Hemingway Toni Morrison 
John Steinbeck Annie Proulx 
Leo Tolstoy Philip Roth 
Anthony Trollope Salman Rushdie 
Mark Twain Richard Russo 
Oscar Wilde Jane Smiley 
Virginia Woolf Amy Tan 
Fantasy Horror 
Terry Goodkind Jack Ketchum 
Neil Gaiman Peter Straub 
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Robert Jordan Sarah Langan 
Patrick Rothfuss Bryan Smith 
George R. R. Martin Hunter Shea 
Terry Pratchett Robert McCammon 
Anne Bishop Clive Barker 
Mercedes Lackey Ramsey Campbell 
Andrzej Sapkowski Jonathan Maberry 
David Eddings James A. Moore 
Jim Butcher Stephen King 
J. R. R. Tolkien James Herbert 
Raymond E. Feist William Peter Blatty 
R.A. Salvatore John Ajvide Lindqvist 
Terry Brooks Richard Laymon 
Mystery/Thriller Romance 
James Patterson Nora Roberts 
Janet Evanovich Judith McNaught 
Michael Connelly Julia Quinn 
Harlan Coben Julie Garwood 
P. D. James Jayne Ann Krentz 
Dennis Lehane Rosamunde Pilcher 
Patricia Cornwell Kathleen E. Woodiwiss 
John Grisham Danielle Steel 
Sue Grafton Debbie Macomber 
Michael Prescott  Robyn Carr 
Diane Mott Davidson Linda Lael Miller 
Agatha Christie Susan Elizabeth Phillips 
 Lee Child Lisa Kleypas 
Dick Francis Johanna Lindsey 
Robert B Parker Lynsay Sands 
Science Fiction (Science Fiction) 
Orson Scott Card Hugh Howey 
Isaac Asimov Karen Traviss 
Robert A. Heinlein Connie Willis 
Arthur C. Clarke William Gibson 
Frank Herbert Cory Doctorow 
Octavia Butler Phillip K. Dick 
Ann Leckie Samuel R Delany 
John Scalzi  
Foils (from Acheson et al., 2008): Patrick Banville, Kristen Steinke, Hiroyuki Oshita, Elinor Harring, 
Lisa Woodward, David Harper Townsend, Anna Tsing, Cameron McGrath, A.C. Kelly, Peter Flaegerty, 
Martha Farah, Craig DeLord, Stewart Simon, Ted Mantel, I.K. Nachbar, Wayne Fillback, Walter Dorris, 
Erich Fagles, Marion Coles Snow, Amy Graham, Giles Mallon, Seth Bakis, David Ashley, Keith 
Cartwright, Larry Applegate, Gloria McCumber, Judith Stanley, Christina Johnson, Jay Peter Holmes, 
Geoffrey Pritchett, Gary Curwen, Harry Coltheart, John Landau, Harriet Troudeau, Roswell Strong, 
Seamus Huneven, Chris Schwartz, Walter LeMour, Elizabeth Engle, Marvin Benoit, Jessica Ann Lewis, 
Arturo Garcia Perez, S.L. Holloway, Stephen Houston, Marcus Lecherou 
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Young Adult Fiction Test (Black & Barnes, in preparation): 
Laurie Halse Anderson Ally Carter Walter Dean Meyers 
Claudia Gray Lauren Oliver E. Lockhart 
Sara Zarr Maggie Stiefvater Carrie Ryan 
Holly Black Cassandra Clare Ally Condie 
Stephanie Perkins Jay Asher Beth Revis 
Sarah Dessen Maureen Johnson Marie Lu 
Emery Lord Jenny Han Leigh Bardugo 
Malinda Lo Brenna Yovanoff Kiersten White 
Libba Bray Scott Westerfeld Alexandra Bracken 
Laini Taylor Kiera Cass MT Anderson 
Simone Elkeles Becca Fitzpatrick Gayle Forman 
David Levithan Amanda Hocking Jandy Nelson 
Tamora Pierce Cinda Williams Chima Veronica Roth 
Siobhan Vivian James Dashner Morgan Matson 
Robyn Schneider Rainbow Rowell Kody Keplinger 
Victoria Aveyard Marissa Meyer Renee Ahdieh 
Mary E Pearson Rae Carson Sarah Rees Brennan 
Matt de la Pena Rachel Cohn Sabaa Tahir 
Kendare Blake Kami Garcia Tahereh Mafi 
Ruta Sepetys Jennifer E. Smith Courtney Summers 
Suzanne Young John Green Suzanne Collins 
A.S. King Laura Ruby Neal Shusterman 
Jason Reynolds Rachel Hawkins Nikki Grimes 
Meg Medina Rachel Hartman Elizabeth Wein 
Erin Bow Margaret Stohl Nicola Yoon 
Lauren Myracle Adam Silvera Andrew Smith 
Sarah J Maas Jessica Brody Susane Colasanti 
Danielle Paige Amie Kaufman Megan Spooner 
Francisco X. Stork Susan Ee Jennifer Donnelly 
Kimberly Derting Elizabeth Eulberg Ransom Riggs 
Kristin Cashore Christopher Paolini Julie Kagawa 
Susan Dennard Veronica Rossi Melina Marchetta 
Jennifer Niven Coe Booth Nova Ren Suma 
Cynthia Leitich Smith Barry Lyga Ryan Graudin 
Kekla Magoon Aisha Saeed Marieke Nijkamp 
Justine Larbalestier Julie Murphy Katie Alender 
 
Foils (from Mar et al., 2006): Lauren Adamson, John Condry, Martin Ford, James Morgan, Eric 
Amsel, Edward Cornell, Harold Gardin, Scott Paris, Margaritia Azmitia, Carl Corter, Frank Gresham, 
Richard Passman, Oscar Barbarin, Diane Cuneo, Robert Inness, David Perry, Reuben Baron, Denise 
Daniels, Frank Keil, Miriam Sexton, Gary Beauchamp, Geraldine Dawson, Reed Larson, K Warner 
Schaie, Thomas Bever, Aimee Dorr, Lynn Liben, Robert Siegler, Elliot Blass, W. Patrick Dickson, Hugh 
Lytton, Mark Strauss, Dale Blyth, Robert Emery, Franklin Manis, Alister Younger, Hilda Borko, Frances 
Fincham, Morton Mendelson, Steve Yussen 
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Nonfiction (adapted from Mar et al., 2006) 
Science Philosophy/Psychology 
Stephen Hawking Roland Barthes 
Stephen J. Gould John Searle 
Richard Dawkins Jean Baudrillard 
Thomas Kuhn Michel Foucault 
Ernst Mayr Bertrand Russell 
John Maynard Smith Daniel Goleman 
Diane Ackerman Oliver Sacks 
Douglas Hofstadter Sam Harris 
Patricia Churchland Jonathan Haidt 
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy Hannah Arendt 
E. O. Wilson Martha Nussbaum 
Rebecca Skloot  
Political/Social commentary Self-Help 
Noam Chomsky  Jack Canfield 
Alain de Botton Philip C. McGraw 
Michael Moore  M Scott Peck 
Eric Schlosser Robert Fulghum 
Bob Woodward Erma Bombeck 
Naomi Klein Stephen R. Covey 
Naomi Wolf Melody Beattie 
Robert D. Kaplan Deepak Chopra 
Louis Menand Marianne Williamson 
Karen Blumenthal Robert Greene 
Narrative Nonfiction  
Lee Gutkind  
Susan Orlean  
Jon Krakauer  
Anne Fadiman  
Dava Sobel  
Simon Winchester  
Ta-Nehisi Coates  
Steve Sheinkin  
Susan Goldman Rubin  
Pamela S. Turner  
Michael Lewis  
Laura Hillenbrand  
  
 
  
 139 
Appendix C 
Pilot Study 
Results from Pilot study with final vignettes, as well as tables with results of analyses 
testing effects of demographics can be found in the following pages. 
 
 
Table A1 
 
Proportions of participants who preferred the unconflicted vs. the conflicted 
protagonist in undergraduate sample for Pilot Study. 
Domain Unconflicted Conflicted 
Proportion 
unconflicted 
p 
Care 74 22 .77 < .001 
Fairness 80 14 .85 < .001 
Authority 59 35 .63 .017 
Loyalty 58 35 .62 .022 
Purity 68 23 .71 < .001 
Note. Binomial tests used to compare proportions (null hypothesis = .50).  Cochran’s Q (df = 4) = 
25.54, p < .001 for omnibus test showed differences in moral judgment across domains. 
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Table A2 
 
Comparisons between scores on Moral Foundations Questionnaire subscales for 
participants who found the conflicted vs. unconflicted protagonists more moral, Pilot 
Study. 
 NC NU MC (SDC) MU (SDU) t p d 
Care        
MFQ Care 22 73 4.94 (0.95) 5.30 (0.78) 1.81 .074 0.42 
MFQ Fairness 22 73 4.94 (0.81) 5.20 (0.81) 1.34 .185 0.32 
MFQ Authority 22 73 3.91 (0.74) 4.04 (0.85) 0.64 .526 0.16 
MFQ Loyalty 22 73 3.96 (0.76) 4.09 (0.83) 0.63 .530 0.16 
MFQ Purity 22 73 3.52 (1.06) 3.59 (0.92) 0.31 .761 0.07 
Fairness        
MFQ Care 14 79 5.21 (1.19) 5.21 (0.75) 0.04 .969 0.01 
MFQ Fairness 14 79 5.01 (1.05) 5.16 (0.77) 0.62 .539 0.16 
MFQ Authority 14 79 3.96 (0.83) 4.00 (0.82) 0.13 .895 0.04 
MFQ Loyalty 14 79 4.05 (0.73) 4.03 (0.81) 0.09 .931 -0.03 
MFQ Purity 14 79 3.76 (0.85) 3.52 (0.95) 0.88 .384 -0.26 
Authority        
MFQ Care 34 59 5.01 (0.85) 5.32 (0.81) 1.74 .086 0.37 
MFQ Fairness 34 59 4.95 (0.76) 5.21 (0.83) 1.50 .136 0.33 
MFQ Authority 34 59 3.86 (0.77) 4.07 (0.85) 1.19 .238 0.26 
MFQ Loyalty 34 59 3.98 (0.84) 4.08 (0.80) 0.58 .562 0.12 
MFQ Purity 34 59 3.38 (0.87) 3.65 (0.97) 1.35 .180 0.30 
Loyalty        
MFQ Care 34 58 5.03 (0.79) 5.37 (0.79) 2.01 .048 0.43 
MFQ Fairness 34 58 4.98 (0.87) 5.27 (0.77) 1.68 .097 0.36 
MFQ Authority 34 58 3.77 (0.70) 4.14 (0.87) 2.07 .041 0.46 
MFQ Loyalty 34 58 3.95 (0.69) 4.12 (0.88) 1.00 .322 0.22 
MFQ Purity 34 58 3.25 (0.85) 3.80 (0.96) 2.71 .008 0.59 
Purity        
MFQ Care 23 67 5.06 (1.03) 5.27 (0.79) 1.04 .303 0.23 
MFQ Fairness 23 67 4.96 (0.79) 5.19 (0.82) 1.21 .231 0.29 
MFQ Authority 23 67 3.86 (0.72) 4.04 (0.84) 0.89 .376 0.22 
MFQ Loyalty 23 67 3.99 (0.86) 4.04 (0.84) 0.26 .793 0.06 
MFQ Purity 23 67 3.36 (0.89) 3.63 (0.93) 1.24 .218 0.30 
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Appendix D 
Table A3 
 
Associations of political orientation, mother education, ethnicity, and religion with 
individual differences in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) subscales, 
Personality, Integrity, Moral Self, Moral Agency, Machiavellianism, Need for 
Cognition, Ambiguity Tolerance, and Imaginative Resistance in the undergraduate 
sample. 
 
Political 
orientation 
Mother’s 
education 
Ethnicity Religion 
 ρ ρ η2 η2 
MFQ Care -.17* -.09 .014 .017 
MFQ Fairness -.22* -.02 .009 .043 
MFQ Authority .42* .01 .013     .131*(b) 
MFQ Loyalty .43* -.03 .065*(a) .134*(c) 
MFQ Purity .37* .02 .008 .242*(d) 
Openness -.19* -.05 .021 .055 
Conscientiousness .17 -.10 .045 .050 
Extraversion .10 -.06 .026 .031 
Agreeableness .11 -.03 .056 .047 
Neuroticism -.08 .02 .028 .023 
Integrity .10 -.10 .055 .073*(e) 
Moral Self < .01 -.04 .009 .020 
Moral Agency .05 -.18* .017 .051 
Machiavellianism -.09 .12 .040 .053 
Need for Cognition -.18* -.13 .008 .092*(f) 
Ambiguity Tolerance -.09 -.02 .007 .047 
Imaginative Resistance .24* -.06 .040 .101*(g) 
Note. * p < .001; Spearman’s rho (ρ) used for correlations with political orientation (single item, 6 
points, 1= very liberal and 6 = very conservative) and mother’s education (7 points; 1 = less than high 
school degree and 7 = graduate or professional degree).  Omnibus eta squared (η2) reported for 
ethnicity and religion. (a) White non-Hispanic had higher MFQ loyalty scores than Black/African 
American and Hispanic (b) Catholics and Hindus scored higher than Agnostics and nones; Protestants 
scored higher than Agnostics, Atheists, religious but unaffiliated, and nones. (c) Agnostics, atheists, 
and “none” scored lower on the MFQ loyalty subscale than Catholics, Protestants, Hindus, and 
“Other.” (d) Catholics, Hindus, Muslims, and Protestants tended to score higher than Agnostics, 
Atheists, religious but unaffiliated, and nones; (e) no pairwise comparisons with cell size > 8 
significant at p < .001 (f) Agnostics reported greater need for cognition than Atheists, Catholics, 
Hindus, Protestants, religious but unaffiliated, and ‘other.” (h) Catholics and Protestants reported 
greater imaginative resistance than Agnostics, Jewish, and nones. 
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Table A4 
 
Associations of political orientation, age, ethnicity, and religion with individual 
differences in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) subscales in the Web 
sample. 
 Political Orientation Age Ethnicity 
MFQ Care -.21 .08 .146*(a) 
MFQ Fairness -.28* .01 .091 
MFQ Authority .55* .12 .090 
MFQ Loyalty .42* .17 .063 
MFQ Purity .51* .15 .052 
Note. * p < .001; Spearman’s rho (ρ) used for correlations with political orientation (single 
item, 6 points, 1= very liberal and 6 = very conservative).  Pearson’s r used for correlations 
with age; Omnibus eta squared (η2) reported for ethnicity. (a) no pairwise comparisons with 
cell size > 2 significant at p < .001. 
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Table A5 
 
Gender differences, Undergraduate sample. 
 NF NM MF (SDF) MM (SDM) t p d 
MFQ Care 351 89 4.71 (0.77) 4.62 (0.73) 1.02 .306 0.12 
MFQ Fairness 351 89 4.67 (0.73) 4.62 (0.73) 0.52 .600 0.06 
MFQ Authority 351 89 4.19 (0.74) 4.15 (0.69) 0.47 .636 0.06 
MFQ Loyalty 351 89 3.98 (0.81) 4.00 (0.79) 0.18 .855 0.02 
MFQ Purity 351 89 3.96 (0.87) 3.89 (0.93) 0.74 .460 0.09 
Openness 352 89 3.34 (0.53) 3.43 (0.60) 1.30 .196 -0.15 
Conscientiousness 352 89 3.61 (0.51) 3.59 (0.62) 0.34 .736 0.04 
Extraversion 352 89 3.25 (0.71) 3.19 (0.72) 0.68 .497 0.08 
Agreeableness 352 89 3.76 (0.51) 3.75 (0.47) 0.15 .878 0.02 
Neuroticism 352 89 3.14 (0.71) 2.71 (0.61) 5.17 < .001 0.64 
Integrity 384 111 3.98 (0.55) 3.77 (0.60) 3.55 < .001 0.37 
Moral Self 384 111 4.20 (0.42) 4.02 (0.46) 3.79 < .001 0.40 
Moral Agency 352 89 3.92 (0.45) 3.88 (0.47) 0.82 .412 0.10 
Machiavellianism 383 111 2.30 (0.58) 2.50 (0.65) 3.19 .001 -0.33 
Imaginative Resistance 349 87 2.82 (0.67) 2.68 (0.69) 1.72 .086 0.20 
Need for cognition 350 89 3.16 (0.57) 3.34 (0.62) 2.49 .013 -0.29 
Ambiguity tolerance 384 110 4.39 (0.70) 4.55 (0.69) 2.11 .036 -0.23 
YA Fiction 384 111 4.55 (5.47) 1.98 (2.27) 4.83 < .001 0.61 
Classics 352 89 4.53 (3.22) 3.80 (3.05) 1.93 .054 0.23 
Literary Fiction 352 89 0.31 (0.74) 0.27 (0.75) 0.49 .628 0.06 
Fantasy 352 89 0.10 (0.46) 0.04 (0.21) 1.08 .281 0.15 
Historical Fiction 352 89 0.10 (0.39) 0.04 (0.21) 1.27 .205 0.17 
Horror 352 89 0.11 (0.46) 0.07 (0.29) 0.85 .399 0.11 
Mystery/Thriller 352 89 0.28 (0.76) 0.10 (0.30) 3.38 .001 0.30 
Romance 352 89 0.23 (0.72) 0.12 (0.52) 1.27 .204 0.16 
Science Fiction 352 89 0.20 (0.67) 0.17 (0.43) 0.37 .713 0.05 
Narrative nonfiction 384 111 0.13 (0.42) 0.05 (0.26) 1.68 .094 0.20 
Nonfiction 384 111 0.80 (1.76) 0.73 (1.24) 0.39 .699 0.05 
Note. All cases analyzed (including those that failed manipulation checks for vignettes). 
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Table A6 
 
Gender differences, Web sample. 
 NF NM MF (SDF) MM (SDM) t p d 
MFQ Care 135 55 5.07 (0.75) 4.65 (0.87) 3.40 .001 0.53 
MFQ Fairness 135 55 4.88 (0.73) 4.80 (0.73) 0.74 .458 0.12 
MFQ Authority 135 55 3.66 (0.92) 3.34 (1.02) 2.12 .035 0.33 
MFQ Loyalty 135 55 3.59 (0.90) 3.32 (0.84) 1.87 .063 0.30 
MFQ Purity 135 55 3.30 (1.15) 2.80 (1.13) 2.73 .007 0.44 
Classics 145 63 8.56 (4.88) 7.24 (4.65) 1.82 .070 0.28 
Literary Fiction 145 63 2.83 (3.91) 2.30 (3.43) 0.92 .357 0.14 
Fantasy 145 63 3.00 (3.20) 4.02 (3.73) 2.00 .047 -0.29 
Historical Fiction 145 63 1.18 (1.75) 0.52 (1.05) 2.76 .006 0.45 
Horror 145 63 0.62 (1.03) 0.56 (1.29) 0.39 .700 0.06 
Mystery/Thriller 145 63 3.97 (3.72) 2.65 (2.70) 2.54 .012 0.41 
Romance 145 63 2.17 (2.86) 0.67 (0.82) 5.78 < .001 0.71 
Science Fiction 145 63 1.92 (2.85) 2.98 (3.49) 2.31 .022 -0.33 
Note. All cases analyzed (including those that failed manipulation checks for vignettes). 
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Table A7 
 
Zero-order correlations between the personality factors of Openness to Experience 
(O), Conscientiousness (C), Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), and Neuroticism 
(N) and all other variables measured in Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
 O C E A N 
Moral Character Judgment (good outcomes)    
Care -0.18 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 
Fairness -0.24 0.03 < 0.01 0.03 0.26 
Authority -0.19 0.11 0.06 0.20 -0.09 
Loyalty -0.10 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.06 
Purity -0.23 0.06 -0.06 0.17 0.11 
Self-report scales      
MFQ Care .27* .18* .06 .22* .11 
MFQ Fairness .23* .16 .06 .16 .07 
MFQ Authority -.11 .20* .12 .23* -.01 
MFQ Loyalty -.04 .20* .29* .22* -.08 
MFQ Purity -.02 .27* .19* .19* -.10 
Integrity .13 .34* .08 .34* -.03 
Moral Self .19* .27* .10 .37* -.02 
Moral Agency .28* .40* .06 .34* -.10 
Machiavellianism -.11 -.24* -.14 .32* .16 
Imaginative Resistance -.13 .11 -.03 .09 .06 
Need for Cognition .54* .31* -.02 .10 -.19* 
Ambiguity Tolerance .40* .22* .15 .12 -.21* 
Classics .20* .04 -.07 .04 .10 
Literary .07 -.07 -.07 -.06 .16 
Fantasy -.04 -.09 -.01 .02 .05 
Historical .08 < .01 .04 .01 .10 
Horror .08 -.11 .01 .04 .10 
Mystery -.03 .04 .04 .04 .04 
Romance  .08 .06 -.01 .02 .10 
Science Fiction .06 -.11 -.05 -.04 .08 
YA fiction < .01 -.03 -.13 .02 .17* 
Narrative nonfiction .01 -.06 < .01 .07 .02 
Nonfiction .12 -.01 -.04 .02 .05 
Note. *p < .001. Cohen’s d for independent samples t-tests presented as effect size for association of 
moral character judgment and personality.  For author recognition tests, Square root transformations 
used to correct for positive skews; because variables still not normally distributed, Spearman’s rho 
reported. 
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Table A8 
 
Zero order correlations (Spearman’s rho) between overall moral character judgment 
and scores on author recognition test genre scales. 
 Good outcomes Bad outcomes 
  p  p 
Undergraduate     
Classics .114 .023 .117 .025 
Literary .090 .076 .022 .675 
Fantasy -.012 .812 .021 .693 
Historical -.018 .725 -.023 .659 
Horror .016 .746 -.023 .659 
Mystery -.025 .614 -.001 .991 
Romance  -.055 .280 -.012 .816 
Science Fiction < .001 .999 -.072 .165 
YA fiction .073 .148 .094 .071 
Narrative nonfiction -.005 .929 -.078 .135 
Nonfiction -.051 .308 .036 .496 
Web     
Classics .278 < .001   
Literary .190 .012   
Fantasy .183 .015   
Historical .167 .026   
Horror .089 .238   
Mystery .128 .090   
Romance  .139 .066   
Science Fiction .216 .004   
Narrative nonfiction .232 .002   
Nonfiction .235 .001   
Note. Undergraduates: df = 392 for good outcomes, df = 368 for bad outcomes; Web: df = 174. All 
variables transformed prior to analyses (square root). Total moral character judgment scored such that 
0 = unconflicted protagonist chosen in all domains and 5 = conflicted protagonist chosen in all 
domains. 
 
